隱喻之理解

Understanding of Metaphor

古秀鈴(Hsiu-Lin Ku)

指導教授 ： 方萬全

共同指導教授 ： 楊金穆

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/博士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.10001

摘要

本論文旨在探究理解隱喻之基礎為何。筆者主張，語質(tone)此概念可成功說明隱喻理解之所在。

許多理論採取相似性或者性質分享等概念來說明隱喻的可理解性，這些理論認為我們從隱喻所理解到的是一種隱喻意義，有別於一般的文字或語句意義，且我們是透過發現相似性理解到隱喻的意義。在第一章，筆者試圖論證，此種進路無法完整地說明隱喻之理解，理由有二。第一、此等進路預設了有所謂的隱喻內容與直述句內容，且前者是由後者所導出;然而，由日常語言使用之經驗，顯示此一預設是可疑的。第二、相似性概念並不適宜作為說明隱喻理解的工具。

在接續的兩章中，筆者將分別討論兩種非建立在相似性概念的隱喻理論。

第二章的討論對象是史登（Josef Stern）的隱喻理論。史登認為我們應該研究的是隱喻詮釋的底層邏輯結構，且設計出隱喻指示詞（Mthat）此一概念來說明這樣的邏輯結構。筆者試圖論證，此一概念只是羅列了理解隱喻的相關元素，並非真正解釋隱喻之理解。

在第三章，筆者討論古騰普蘭（Samuel Guttenplan）的隱喻理論。他認為除了文字能有述詞功能外，非語言的對象或物體也能有述詞功能，即我們能透過某對象看出另一對象的相關訊息。在理解隱喻時，文字帶領我們到所指的對象，再由此對象去描述主詞，即由此對象提供對於主詞的相關訊息。這種說明似乎指出了理解隱喻的基礎，筆者將論證，此舉只是再次宣稱隱喻的功能，而非解釋是什麼讓我們能從一物看出另一物的相關訊息，即，我們仍不清楚隱喻的理解是如何可能。

在第四章中，筆者提出自己對於隱喻理解的看法。一個語詞的意義，其成分除了意思(sense)外，還有引起語言使用者某種觀感的語質（tone）。筆者論證，正是此一語質概念，可成功說明隱喻之理解；主詞與述詞間所產生的語質共鳴，即是隱喻理解的所在。

筆者在第四章中所建構出的理論，極可能受到戴維森（Donald Davidson）在其深具影響力的“What Metaphors Mean”一文中觀點的挑戰。在第五章中，筆者試圖回應此一挑戰。戴維森認為，一般所以為的隱喻意義只是類似看圖畫般的效果，不能說是隱喻語句本身的意義。筆者將論證，隱喻語句的確可具有其本身的意義，如果我們注意到語句意義中的一個重要成分，即筆者在第四章中所提及的語質，其在隱喻理解時所展現的功能。此外，筆者也將指出戴維森在“What Metaphors Mean”中建構「沒有所謂的隱喻意義」此一論點時的諸多問題。

關鍵字

隱喻 ； 相似性 ； 語質 ； 語質共鳴 ； 隱喻意義 ； 隱喻指示詞 ； 戴維森 ； 古騰普蘭 ； 史登

並列摘要

The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the basis of the understanding of metaphor. I suggest that the notion of tone, one of the ingredients of meaning, can explain it.

Some philosophers appeal to the notion of similarity or proper-sharing to explain what makes metaphor intelligible. They think what we get from a metaphor is a kind of metaphorical meaning, which is distinct from the literal meaning of a sen¬tence, and similarity is the basis to reach it. In Chapter 1, I argue that this approach to metaphor is misleading and cannot completely account for metaphor, because (i) it mistakenly presumes that the content we get from a metaphor is definitely distinct, and also solely derived, from the literal meaning, and (ii) the notion of similarity is not theoreti¬cally appropriate to account for metaphor, for the judgment of the similarity between two objects is consequent to the understanding of metaphor.

In Chapter 2, I criticize Josef Stern’s proposal for another perspective to think of the intelligibility of metaphor. Stern suggests what we need in the study of metaphor should be a logical analy¬sis of the underlying structure of interpreting a metaphor. By virtue of the facts that there is not only one interpretation for a single metaphor and that the relations between the expressions and the resulted metaphorical content seem to be multiple, we shall not keep our attention finding a single correct relation, but on the frame of this ability of interpreting a metaphor, which is in his view what distinguishes meta¬phor from the literal. The rule-like operator ‘Mthat’ is designed to represent such a frame. I shall point out that such framework for interpreting a metaphor is sim¬ply collecting the elements involved in the understanding of metaphor, which fails to explain the intelligibility of metaphor, in particular, the metaphoricity, as the core of the understanding of metaphor.

In Chapter 3, I criticize Samuel Guttenplan’s proposal of semantic descent account of metaphor. Guttenplan thinks that we have semantic ability to get something from non-linguistic objects to bear on another thing. Specifically, non-linguistic objects can also predicate something else as normally linguistic terms do; Guttenplan dubs this as 'qualification by object.' In understanding a metaphor, the expression in the metaphorical sen¬tence leads us to the object referred (Guttenplan dubs this as semantic descent) and then we take the object to predicate the subject. Although semantic descent account seems to approach to the basis of the understanding of metaphor, I still doubt its achievement, for what it appeals is a repeat that we have the ability to get the metaphorical insight, and this is not enough to explain for what enables the generation of metaphorical insight.

In Chapter 4, I propose the view that the basis of the understanding of metaphor lies in our grasping of tone, one of the ingredients of meaning. The tone of an expression has evocative power to arouse a language user’s mood about the use of the expression. And if two expressions can evocate the same mood on language users, I call these expressions are consonant in tone. The consonance of the tones between the predicator and the subject bumps out the metaphorical insight, that is, it is the basis of the understanding of metaphor.

In Chapter 5, I try to respond to Davidson’s challenge to the effect that there is no cognitive content of metaphor. I argue that Davidson’s reasons to deny the metaphori¬cal insight as the content of metaphorical sentence are dubious, and that his formulation of metaphor as simply a kind of effect, which is similar to what we experience when watching a picture, is hardly an account of the understanding of metaphor. In particular, if my suggestion in Chapter 4 is successful (i.e. the consonance of tone explains the understanding of metaphor), then surely the metaphorical in¬sight can be lodged as the content of metaphor, since the tone is also one of the ingredi¬ents of the meaning of the expression.

並列關鍵字

metaphor ； similarity ； Mthat ； qualification by object ； semantic descent ； tone ； consonance of tone ； metaphorical meaning ； Davidson ； Guttenplan ； Stern

參考文獻

Beardsley, R. (1962). “The Metaphorical Twist”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22: 293-307.

Beardsley, R. (1976). “Metaphor and Falsity”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 35: 218-222.

Bedouzenhout, A., (2001). “Metaphor and What is Said: A Defense of a Direct Expression View of Metaphor” in P. A. French and H. K. Wettstein (eds)., Figurative Language (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers), 156-186.

Black, M. (1979b). “More on Metaphor”, reprinted in Ortony (1993).

Borg, E. (2002). “The Semantic Significance of What is Said”, Protosociology 17: Semantic Theory and Reported Speech: 6-24.