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  • 學位論文

蘋果公司電子書公平交易法一案給予未來公平交易實務的啟示

An Examination of the case, United States v. Apple Inc., with implications towards Future Practices of Anti-Trust Law

指導教授 : 湯明哲
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摘要


過去蘋果公司進入已存在新市場時,如果該市場具有強烈競爭優勢的競爭者,蘋果公司傾向採取非價格競爭的策略,而選擇以其他優勢和既有廠商競爭,例如在電子書市場,蘋果公司即以代理者模型和最惠協定和美國的六大出版社訂立契約,提供iBookstore使用者電子書市場中最優惠的價格。然而其行為因為影響出版社及既有競爭者亞馬遜的供應契約,亞馬遜公司因市占率共計超過百分之六十的五大出版社的聯合要求,重新簽訂了和蘋果公司相同的供應契約,必須放棄先前以低於供書成本的低價策略。 美國司法部(Department of Justice)於亞馬遜檢舉後介入調查,並認定蘋果公司違反美國休曼法第一條(Sherman Act Section 1)禁止反競爭協約的規定,紐約地方法院認同美國司法部的調查結果,並依據本身違反法則(Per Se Rule)認定蘋果公司的行為違反公平交易法。 本研究分析美國法的既判例,嘗試建構本案在本身違反法則和合理原則(Rule of Reason)間的定位,使用平台分析及情境分析解釋代理模式和最惠協定構成反競爭結果的依據,研究結果認為蘋果公司為水平聯合定價的幫助者,符合美國法判例本身違反法則,因此違反休曼法第一條,縱使不使用本身違反法則,其行為因為無法證明是有益市場競爭、且是新進入市場者所必須,亦難以通過合理原則的檢驗,仍舊構成反托拉斯契約,違反休曼法第一條。

並列摘要


As there were strong competitors existing in the e-book market, Apple Inc. choose a strategy to avoid a price war when entering that new market, choosing to compete via non-price advantages. In pursuit of its strategy, Apple Inc. signed contracts combining an agency model and price parity provisions with the Big Six publishing companies. This conduct influenced the contracts of supply between Amazon and those publishing companies which, comprising more than sixty percent of the publishing market, forced Amazon to yield to a renegotiation of prior contracts meeting the same terms to which Apple Inc. had agreed with those companies. Thus Amazon abandoned its low pricing strategy. The US Department of Justice started its investigation after Amazon filed a complaint to the government accusing Apple Inc. of violating the anti-trust law, the Sherman Act, Section 1. The U.S. Federal Southern District Court of New York agreed with the argument of the Department of Justice to assess the case on the basis of the per se rule. This research explores the precedents of the Supreme Court of United States in defining the legal precedents and case histories involving both relevant bases of legal analysis via the per se rule and the rule of reason. After analyzing the intricacy of the agency model and price parity provisions through the platform theory and scenario analyses, this research concludes that Apple Inc. did indeed violate the Sherman Act Section 1 even as the courts had ruled. This is because Apple Inc. had facilitated horizontal price-fixing which is deemed as a per se illegality. Even by the rule of reason, Apple Inc. failed to prove that its conduct benefited the e-book market and /or was necessary for it to enter the market as a new entrant. Therefore, Apple could not prove that it had not violated the Sherman Act Section 1.

參考文獻


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