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  • 學位論文

中國國民黨的意識形態與組織特質

The Ideology and Organizational Traits of the Chinese Nationalist Party

指導教授 : 胡佛

摘要


迄今為止,大部分對臺灣戰後政治發展的研究都認為執政時的中國國民黨是列寧主義政黨或準列寧主義政黨,並把該黨的黨組織視為其政權的重要支柱之一。但這只是基於國民黨黨章條文及其政權的某些表象所做的論斷。實際上,國民黨並不具備列寧主義政黨在意識型態與組織結構上的要件,同時其黨組織對黨員和社會也沒有列寧主義政黨那種動員能力。 如果我們把列寧主義政體和列寧主義政黨區別開來,然後把後者僅僅視為工具性的「組織的武器」,那麼,一個列寧主義政黨至少應符合以下三個要件:一、全黨上下在意識型態──也就是黨的目標與路線──上具有高度共識;二、黨的組織原則是民主集中制(國民黨稱之為「民主集權制」);三、黨的基層組織是細胞式的行動單位。至於其意識型態所定的目標是否共產主義社會、其奪取政權的方式是武裝革命或和平選舉、是否信奉階級鬥爭、當政後是否採用黨國體制等等,都不是列寧主義政黨的必要條件。 在意識型態方面,列寧主義政黨的「意識型態」是用來指引黨的政綱政策以及黨員之集體行動的。其內容包括:現狀分析、目標選擇以及路線說明。一個有效的意識型態必須具備精準的現狀分析、道德性強的目標和可行性高的路線。一個列寧主義政黨必須始終不斷地進行意識型態建構工作,也就是不斷地檢討現狀、目標與路線,把意識型態的理想落實到「當務之急是什麼?」的問題上。 國民黨的官方意識型態是孫中山提出的三民主義。但是,如果我們把它看作思想體系,會發現它的內容過於混雜,難以貫通而引起黨員的信仰。三民主義其實只是一套問題框架(即「三大問題」),內容的變化並不影響這套框架的結構。只要堅持其基本價值(民族獨立、民主憲政、民生均富),三民主義很容易適應時勢所需而重新表述為新的政綱。因此,國民黨要以三民主義為基礎進行意識型態建構,並非不可能。 不過,在1927年清黨以後,國民黨對意識型態建構始終不夠重視。在蔣中正的思想中,主義與政策是斷裂的,未來的理想與當務之急沒有明顯相關,於是主義就失去了號召力量。蔣中正又以儒家思想的道德說教和法西斯主義的領袖崇拜取代意識型態上的領導,於是對意識型態建構更加忽視。在來臺初期,國民黨曾想改變作法,以意識型態凝聚黨內共識。但是,它所提出的意識型態對現狀分析不夠精準(如:中蘇關係、美國對華政策),選定的主要目標(反中共)道德性也不高,路線的可行性又低(反攻受阻於美國),因此其意識型態建構並不成功。到了1970年代,國民黨逐漸放棄了意識型態建構的努力。缺乏意識型態的共識作基礎,國民黨的黨組織就成了派系競逐利益的工具。 而在組織結構方面,從1938年起,國民黨的黨組織始終是以法西斯主義的「領袖原則」為依據,所有權力向上集中於領袖一人,民主集權制無法落實。其基層組織既無權力,也沒有集體行動能力,黨員的積極性亦無法提升。 總之,本論文從歷史研究途徑檢討國民黨自孫中山改組該黨以來的歷史,發現國民黨在蔣氏父子領導下實在稱不上是列寧主義政黨。其黨組織對內對外皆無動員力量。臺灣的國民黨政權對社會的滲透能力是基於該黨來臺後重建的特務組織和日本殖民政府留下來的行政體系,黨組織最多只有輔助的作用。這樣的政權因缺乏意識型態的說服力和黨組織的動員能力,無力紮根於臺灣社會、化解省籍問題(臺灣最根本的政治與社會分裂線),所以其政權的變遷方向必然是臺灣化。並且,由於國民黨政權在軍事、政治、經濟上皆高度依賴美國支持,所以美國政策轉向所引起的外交挫敗會導致國民黨政權的正當性危機,於是形成臺灣政治變遷的時機。

並列摘要


Most of the studies on the post-WWII political development of Taiwan have referred to the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang, as either a Leninist or a quasi-Leninist party, and considered its party organization a pillar of the regime before it lost power in 2000. However, this view is only based on some clauses of the party constitution as well as superficial aspects of the regime. In fact, the Kuomintang did not satisfy the prerequisites for a Leninist party in terms of ideology and organization, and its party organization did not have the mobilization capability, which is characteristic of a Leninist party, both among its members and in society. If we differentiate a Leninist party from its regime, and consider the former only a means, i.e., the “organizational weapon,” to an end, we can then specify three essential elements of such a party. First and foremost, all the party members must have a strong consensus in its ideology, i.e., its political goals and party lines. Secondly, its organization must be based on the principle of democratic centralism. And thirdly, the whole party is composed of cells as its basic units, which are capable of taking actions collectively. It is not necessary for a Leninist party to embrace Communist society as its final aim, to pursue a revolutionary path towards power, to believe in the “law” of class struggle, or to adopt a party-state system once in power. The ideology of a Leninist party is to guide the platforms of the party and its members’ collective actions. It consists of analyses of the current situation, the choice of goals, and the elaboration of the party lines. How effective the ideology is depends on the precision of its analyses of current situations, the moral appeal of its goals, and the feasibility of the party lines. A Leninist party must constantly work on the construction of its ideology, that is, review unremittingly the current situation, goals and party lines, so that the ideal can be materialized in the answer to “what is to be done?” The official ideology of the Kuomintang is “Three Principles of the people,” which was invented by Dr. Sun Yat-sen over a century ago. If we take it as a system of theory, it is too incoherent to serve as a base of a belief. But it can also be seen as a framework of three important political issues, and then we can keep the framework intact while we change its contents. As long as its fundamental values, say national independence, democratic constitutionalism, and equitable affluence, remain unchanged, the Three Principles can be reformulated into new party platforms according to the needs of the time. Therefore, it is surely possible for the Kuomintang to construct an effective ideology based on the Three Principles. Nevertheless, since the purge of Communist elements in 1927, the Kuomintang had never paid enough attention to ideological construction. In the thought of Chiang Kai-shek, the doctrines and current policies were disconnected. In other words, the urgent tasks of the present were not related to the future ideal. Hence the latter lost its appeal. To make things worse, Chiang substituted moral preaching of Confucianism and Führer worship of Fascism for ideological leadership, and, consequently, he ignored ideological construction even further. Although in the first decade or so after the Kuomintang moved to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang tried to build an ideological basis for the consensus among the Kuomintang members, he did not succeed. The major reasons for his failure include mistakes in the judgment on current situation, insufficient moral appeal of its political goals, and low feasibility of the party lines. The Kuomintang eventually gave up any further effort in ideological construction in the 1970s. Without an ideological basis for its members’ consensus, the party organization of the Kuomintang could only be a tool of factional politics. Moreover, the primary organizational principle of the Kuomintang had always been the Fascist Führer principle since 1938. The democratic centralism in its constitution could hardly function under a dictatorial leader like Chiang Kai-shek. Besides, its basic units had neither power nor capability of collective actions, and, as a result, the morale of its members was generally low. Following a historical approach, this dissertation examines the history of the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen reorganized it in 1924, and finds out that it is definitely not a Leninist party. Instead of party organization, what makes the Kuomintang regime capable of penetrating Taiwan’s society is its secret service and the administrative system left behind by the Japanese colonial government. The party organization of the Kuomintang was too weak to take root in the local society, nor could it overcome the conflict between Mainlanders and native Taiwanese, which is the fundamental political-societal cleavage within Taiwan society. Once the Kuomintang regime is forced to change, the main course of change could only be towards Taiwanization. In addition, because of the dependence of the Kuomintang regime upon the U.S., the timing of regime change was determined by changes in the U.S.’ foreign policy, which brought about successive legitimacy crises to which the Kuomintang regime had to respond.

參考文獻


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