立法院審議政府決算機制之研究

A Study of Government Final Accounts in the Legisletive Yuan on Taiwan

何秀英(Hsiu Ying Ho)

指導教授 ： 唐代彪

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201603724

摘要

西元20世紀以來，民主浪潮席捲全球，民眾意識高漲，要求政府提供服務的範圍與行政管理的項目漸增。政府為推動施政，爰設機關、置人事、編預算以執行，其中預算係政府依其施政計畫所估計一定期間之收支。國會透過預算審議程序，授予行政部門運用國家資源的權利，行政部門自然有責任與義務向國會報告有關預算執行、施政管理、計畫推動情形等。
決算係預算制度之一環，決算審查係國會對於行政部門預算執行情形予以審議後，將其結果供次年預算審查及政策推行之檢討。政府決算審核的重要性不亞於預算之審議，除可呈現施政成果的良窳與國家財政經濟演變趨勢外，亦可評量政府施政績效與缺失，供以後年度釐訂施政方針、編製預算及改進財務管理之參考，透過決算之審議，增進人民對政府實際財政狀況之瞭解，釐清機關首長施政之財務責任。然而近年來面對各項公共支出的大幅增加，政府可運用的財政資源日趨緊縮，在「重預算、輕決算」的政治文化中，不僅預算執行機關未能徹底落實績效管理，決算審核結果亦不被重視，又如何能達到決算的審核功能，及回饋作為新年度擬訂施政方針及編列預算之參考。其中究竟是源於立法院決算審議制度設計不良所導致，抑或是其他原因所導致。本研究嘗試以課責理論視角，並參考英國、美國與日本等先進國家國會審議決算制度，作深入性的研析與探討，期能提供我國立法機關重新思考在公共課責體系中的定位、角色與功能。
本研究依所蒐集之資料及訪談中央政府總決算編報機關行政院主計總處、審查機關審計部及審議機關立法院之資深行政長官，計獲取五項研究發現：(1)立法院對行政部門的決算審議，僅能做到間接性監督，無法做到直接課責；(2)決算法不當限縮立法院審議決算對象，造成課責對象錯置與過度課責情形；(3)立法院將審核報告列為審議對象，與先進國家國會列為參考資料的作法迥異；(4)審計部係立法院的重要夥伴機關，惟決算法卻定位為課責關係，錯誤扭曲兩者對應角色；(5)行政機關首長不必然要列席決算審議會議，肇致重預算，輕決算的政治文化。
茲依據上述研究發現，謹擬具七項建議事項，提供立法院作為爾後審議中央政府總決算參考：(1)刪除決算法第27條，改正行政部門越權及不當限縮立法院決算審議權之做法；(2)修正立法院職權行使法，納列審議決算機制，強化對行政機關首長的課責規範；(3)修正中央政府總決算審核報告案審查程序，明確規範決算機關首長應列席審查會及應提送之報告資料等，以完善決算審查制度，強化課責效果；(4)規範編造決算機關首長列席審查會應提送之報告資料及內容；(5)決算與預算審議之連結法制化，強化決算回饋與課責功能；(6)決算法第28條「自動生效」規定潛藏危機，允應檢討研議修正；(7)允應檢討審計機關最終審定權之存廢。

關鍵字

立法院 ； 國會組織 ； 委員會 ； 決算 ； 課責 ； 審計

並列摘要

Since 20th century, the wave of democracy has swept the globe. With the emerging awareness of the public, the requirements for items about service and administration provided by government have been increasing. To promote the policy, the government establishes related authorities, sets personnel and compiles the budget to execute. The budget refers to the receipts and disbursements in a certain period estimated by the government based on the policy plans. Through the program of budget review, the congress grants administrative department the rights to utilize national resources. In addition, the administrative department has the responsibility and obligation to report to the congress for the information about budget execution, policy management, plan promotion, etc.
Final accounting is a part of budget system. The budget review means that the congress reviews the budget execution status of administrative department and then keeps the results for the review of budget review and policy implementation next year. The importance of final accounting audit is not less than the same of budget review. It is not only because it shows the quality of the policy and the evolution tendency of the national fiscal economy, but it can also be used to evaluate the performance and deficiency of the policies that the government implements and provide references for making and revising the administrative policies, planning budget and improving financial management. Through the final accounting review, it promotes the awareness of public to the actual financial performance of the government and clarity the financial responsibilities of the heads of authorities. However, in recent years, the available financial resources gradually reduce as various public expenditures sharply increase. In the political culture of “paying more attention to budget rather than final accounting”, the authorities to execute the budget cannot completely put the performance management into effect and the results of final accounting audit are not being valued as well. Under the circumstance, the audit function of final accounting is not enforced completely and the feedback cannot be the reference for making administrative policies and planning budget in the upcoming year. Is that led by the poor design of the final accounting review system of Legislative Yuan? Does any other reason exist? The research conducted a deep research and analysis from the view of accountability theory and with the reference of how the congress review the final accounting system in the advanced countries such as the UK, the US and Japan, expecting to provide some thoughts for the legislative body of Taiwan to rethink its position, role and function in the public accountability system.
By collecting data and interviewing the senior chief executives of competent final reporting authorities of central government such as Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, , Audit Office of Approving Authority and the Deliberation Authority, the study put forwards five research findings in total: (1) The Legislative Yuan can only indirectly supervise the final accounting review of the executive departments, instead of directly accounting them; (2) The Financial Statement Act improperly limits the scope of object which the Legislative Yuan reviews, which causes wrongly chasing and excessive liability; (3) The Legislative Yuan lists the audit reports as the objects to review and this is widely different from that of the advanced countries, where usually list them as the references; (4) Audit Office is the important partner of Legislative Yuan, but the Financial Statement Act defines it as the accountable relation, which distorts their corresponding roles; (5) The attendance of the head of the administrative authority in final accounting review meeting is not necessary, which results in the political culture of “paying more attention to budget rather than final accounting”.
According to above research findings, the study draws up seven suggestions as references for the Legislative Yuan to review the final accounting: (1) Delete the Article 27 of Financial Statement Act to correct the behavior that the executive department goes beyond its duty to limit the rights of Legislative Yuan to review the final accounting; (2) Revise Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power, list the final accounting review system and strengthen the accountability standards for the head of administrative authority; (3) Revise the audit program of Central Government Final Accounting Audit Report to clarify that the head of auditing authority shall attend the review meeting and the report data shall be submitted for completing the final accounting reviewing system and strengthening the effect of accountability; (4) Stipulate the report data and content submitted in the review meeting by the head of auditing authority; (5) Legislate the connection of final accounting review and budget review to reinforce the functions of final accounting feedback and accountability; (6) The rule of Financial Statement Act Article 28 “Automatically take effect” has potential danger and it should be corrected by reviewing and researching; (7) Allow to discuss if the right of final approval of the auditing authority should be abolished.

並列關鍵字

Legislative Yuan ； Congress organizations ； Committee ； Final accounting ； Accountability ； Audit

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