現金流量基礎及盈餘基礎績效衡量指標對商譽減損認列產生之差異

Can cash-flow-based and earnings-based measure of performance make difference on goodwill impairment

王震東(Chen-Tung Wang)

指導教授 ： 王全三

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.00390

摘要

過去對於CEO誘因支付與會計裁決性決策的文獻主要集中在探討盈餘基礎的績效衡量指標與經理人會計決策間之關連 Healy (1985)，很少研究探討紅利獎酬制度混合現金流量基礎績效衡量指標對於經理人裁決性會計決策之影響，本研究分析紅利獎酬制度中盈餘基礎及現金流量基礎績效衡量指標，對於CEO使用裁量性決策低估商譽減損認列的影響，具體而言本研究主要目的有二:
一、本研究探討紅利獎酬制度中，績效衡量指標對於SFAS 142所要求經理人使用會計裁量性決策，對於估計無法驗證的公平價值之間的關係，並檢視現金流量基礎及盈餘基礎基效衡量指標是否對於商譽減損產生差異。
二、本研究測試現金流量基礎及盈餘基礎的績效衡量指標與CEO低估商譽減損認列間之關連，並檢視當公司採用盈餘基礎績效衡量指標，則紅利獎酬制度中的績效衡量指標是否可能提供強烈操弄盈餘的誘因，反觀採用現金流量績效衡量指標，則是否減緩了經理人操弄盈餘的誘因。
實證結果顯示，當公司採用盈餘基礎績效衡量指標，紅利獎酬制度中的績效衡量指標確實可能提供經理人操弄盈餘誘因的誘因，以最大化經理人自身的紅利，本研究也指出當公司只有採用盈餘基礎的績效衡量指標，紅利獎酬制度中的契約誘因確實可能提供經理人較強的誘因低估商譽減損，顯示CEO可能使用裁量性會計決策估計無法驗證的未來現金流量，以達到自我紅利最大化，反觀現金流量基礎的績效衡量指標卻減緩經理人以裁決性會計決策操弄盈餘的誘因，顯示紅利獎酬制度中的績效衡量指標確實會對CEO產生不同的報導誘因。

關鍵字

CEO誘因薪酬支付 ； 績效衡量指標 ； 會計裁量性 ； 現金流量 ； 公平價值會計

並列摘要

While existing researches focus on the association between earning-based performance measures in bonus plan and managers’ accounting choice (Healy 1985), there is scarce research on the association of bonus plan mixed with cash-flow-based performance measure with the manager’s discretionary accounting choice. I analyze the effect of the earning-based and cash-flow-based performance measures in bonus plans on CEO’s discretionary decision to understate the recognition of goodwill impairment loss. Specifically, the purposes of this study can be summarized as follows:
1.This study investigates the association between the performance measures in bonus plans and the use of accounting discretion which is required by SFAS 142 to estimate the unverifiable fair value to see whether cash-flow-based and earnings-based measure of performance can make difference on goodwill impairment.
2.I test the association between the performance measures and the understatement of goodwill impairment recognition. And I examine whether the performance measures in bonus plan may provides strong incentive to manipulate earnings when earning-based performance measures are adopted while the adoption of cash-flow-based performance measures can mitigate such effect.
Empirical results show that if earning-based performance measure is used to evaluate CEO’s bonus, CEO will have incentive to manipulate earnings for maximizing bonus. The contracting incentive to understate goodwill impairment is strong in firms that just include earnings-based performance measures in the bonus plan, suggesting that CEO may use discretionary accounting decision on unverifiable estimation of future cash flow for maximizing cash bonus. In contrast, the association mitigates when cash-flow-based performance measures are adopted as performance measures, suggesting that different performance measures in bonus plans result in different reporting incentives for CEOs.

並列關鍵字

CEO Incentive Pay ； Performance Measure ； Accounting Discretion ； Cash Flow ； Fair Value Accounting

參考文獻

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