在高度競爭的全球經濟環境下,企業單純靠內部有機成長已不足以因應外在競爭壓力,因此,透過併購快速拓展規模之無機成長,成為多數企業強化自身競爭力的策略選項之一;然而,併購交易雖十分熱絡,部分案件卻因交易雙方對於收購價格無法達成共識而以失敗收場,由於價格之訂定並無一套既定之準則可遵循,故往往是併購案件中最困難的一環。為了取得目標公司多數股權,收購公司常以高於市價之價格購買目標公司股份,此差額所代表的即為控制股東所能享有之好處,故併購對價中隱含了控制溢價,本研究透過65筆台灣公開收購與股份轉換合併案件,建立迴歸模型,試著探討影響併購控制溢價之因素。 實證結果發現,若收購公司於交易前對目標公司不具控制力,且該次交易亦非鉅額交易,但於交易後取得控制力時,控制溢價幅度較小,兩者呈顯著負相關;此外,控制溢價幅度與目標公司稅前息前折舊前總資產報酬率呈顯著正相關,而目標公司規模、目標公司現金及約當現金占總資產比率、目標公司與收購公司之現金及約當現金比則與控制溢價幅度呈顯著負相關。
In the highly competitive global economic environment, it is not enough for firms to response the pressure of competition simply by internal organic growth. Thus, increasing the size of the firms through M&A activities, which is called inorganic growth, becomes one of the alternative strategies of many firms to strengthen their competitiveness. However, even though there are many M&A transactions, some of them fail because of the disagreement on the transaction price, and due to the lack of pricings standards, pricing becomes the most difficult part of the M&A transactions. In order to acquire most of stocks of the target firms, acquiring firms will pay a price above the the target firms’ market price, and the difference is the benefits that control shareholders can enjoy, so the transaction price involves control premium. This study constructs a regression model by 65 transactions of tender offers and stock exchange of Taiwan, trying to find factors affecting control premium. Accroding to the regression results, if acquiring firms don’t have control over the target firms before the transaction, the transaction is not a block trade, and acquiring firms get control after the transaction, the percentage of control premim is smaller, which means that there is a negative relationship between them. Besides, the percentage of control premium increases with target firms’ return on total assets before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, and decreases with target firms’ size, cash position, and the ratio of target firms’ cash position to acquiring firms’ cash position.