信用擔保機制下供應鏈中銀行最佳決策之研究

An Optimal Decision of Bank in Supply Chain Under Credit Guarantee Mechanism

徐慶凱(Ching-Kai Hsu)

指導教授 ： 蔣明晃

國立臺灣大學/工學院/工業工程學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201701371

摘要

台灣中小企業的數量眾多，潛力無窮，是國內經濟發展的重要角色。但最常面臨的問題即是由於規模不大，導致銀行信用評等不高，無法提供好的利率，融資不順利下，讓中小企業總是面臨資金不足的窘境，供應鏈中的一環節就會因此出問題，導致整個供應鏈出現危機。
此研究建立一個信用擔保機制，在供應鏈金融的背景下，零售商為規模較大的企業，而供應商為中小型企業，容易面臨資金不足的情況。而零售商將會幫供應商做部分擔保，與銀行建立機制，當供應商無法如期償還債務時，要分擔銀行多少損失。此時，整個供應鏈中，零售商與供應商可視為一體，與銀行成為借貸的兩方，銀行可以藉此降低風險，減少資訊不對稱，供應商可獲得較低的資金成本，讓生產力提高，而零售商利潤亦會上升，間接達成雙贏局面。
此模型採用Stackelberg模型，銀行為此模型的領導者，在知道零售商的反應函數下決定利率跟擔保比例。而零售商在銀行決定利率後，再確定訂購數量與單位價格，此模型站在銀行的角度，目標式為最大化銀行利潤。本研究探討不同情境下銀行該如何決定利率，對重要的因子做敏感度分析，在此模型的最佳解上獲得結論，讓銀行能在信用擔保機制下擔任領導者的角色做出最佳決策。

關鍵字

信用擔保機制 ； 供應鏈金融 ； 中小企業 ； 斯塔克柏格競爭

並列摘要

There are a huge amount of small and medium enterprises in Taiwan. They play an important role in domestic economic development. We are often confronted with the problem which is small scale. That is why the credit rating of bank is not high and the bank cannot provide good interest rates. The small and medium enterprises are always faced with lack of funds.
In this study, a credit guarantee mechanism is constructed. The retailer helps the supplier to make a part of guarantee and construct the mechanism between the supplier and the bank. When the supplier cannot repay the debts on time, the retailer shares how much the bank lost. At this time, we can look upon the retailer and the supplier as an integral and become the lender and the borrower with the bank. The bank can reduce the risk and decrease asymmetry information. Then, the supplier can get lower capital cost and increase productivity, and the profit of the retailer also increase.
We use Stackelberg model in this study. The leader is the bank which can know the retailer’s response function to determine the interest risk and the proportion of credit guarantee. The retailer determines the order quantity and unit price after the bank has already determined the interest risk. The objective function is maximum the profit of the bank. In this study, we discuss that the bank how to determine the interest risk in different conditions and make sensitivity analysis in important factors. In summary, the bank can make the optimal decision in the leader of a credit guarantee mechanism.

並列關鍵字

Credit Guarantee Mechanism ； Supply Chain Finance ； Stackelberg Game

參考文獻

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