論老莊哲學中「道」之無限性與人之自主問題

On the Infinity of Tao and the Subjectivity of Human Beings’ in Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s Philosophies

馬耘(Yun Ma)

指導教授 ： 陳鼓應

共同指導教授 ： 陳榮華

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/博士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.00222

摘要

本文乃老莊哲學之比較研究。本文以「求融貫」為研究之方法，嚴格依據《老子》、《莊子》之文字，詳細辨析並論證老莊二家對於「道」與「人之自主性」及其相關問題之明確主張。間亦針對時下流行之若干學術見解諸如「道」之「形上實體說」、「主觀境界說」、「本根說」加以商榷。
經由此研究，本文將系統展示老莊二家乃於「世界觀」、「形上預設」、「人存有之說明」及「人生哲學」等等各方面皆迥異之兩套哲學。本文認為，老子哲學中之「形上之道」，實即人確可以理智加以掌握之宇宙客觀規律，且此規律本身不顯現任何「價值」。莊子哲學之「形上之道」則為造物者所施之「化」之歷程，「人」對此「化」全無影響、干涉之餘地，人僅能知有此「化」之事實；至於「化」之詳情，諸如是否有「規律」或「目的性」，則全不可知也。由此世界觀及形上之預設，老莊二家對「人」之「存有」之說明及人生哲學乃大不相同，而可謂之有「積極應世」與「消極應化」之別。老子認為，人於宇宙之客觀規律中，自可保有「自主性」，「人」之「私」、「欲」一類自主之活動基本上即可判為有意義，人可利用此「道」之規律，作為達成「人」之「私」、「欲」之工具，並從而設定若干應然之作為。換言之，老子對人生可建立正面之肯定，亦認可人對「世界」可採取積極之作為也。莊子則不然，莊子哲學中，「道」或即「化」之事實，籠罩包含「人」在內之一切存有，全無「人」參與或掌控之餘地，莊子於此情形下，亦認為人有「自主性」，人生之困擾，即根源於妄圖以此「自主性」對「世界」加以掌控。因此，人之「自主性」及「應然作為」，實應表現於取消妄動之意圖，亦即對「心」加以處理，以求能坦然面對「化」之一切事實。換言之，莊子對人生採取一極消極之態度，與老子大不相同。
既可見老莊有種種根本且關鍵之差異，本文指出以老莊相異之處為研究面向，一方面更可深入掌握二家學說之義蘊，另一方面，亦能予治我國學術史者參考，以求避免因忽視老莊之根本差異，而雜用老莊命題與理論以論所謂「道家哲學」之病。

關鍵字

老子 ； 莊子 ； 道 ； 宇宙發生根源 ； 主觀境界 ； 自主性 ； 應然之道 ； 心 ； 自我

並列摘要

This dissertation is a comparative study of Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s philosophies. Following the methodology of “cohesion,” we carefully analyze and argue about Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s specific claims over “Tao,” “subjectivity” of human beings and related issues strictly based on the texts of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Besides, we also try to discuss the currently popular academic opinions, like the doctrines of “metaphysical reality” of “Tao,” “subjective state of mind,” and “origins.”
Through this study, we will systematically demonstrate how Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s philosophies are completely different in terms of “world views,” “metaphysical assumptions,” “explanations about humans’ being,” and “philosophies of life,’ etc. In this dissertation, it is assumed that the “metaphysical Tao” in Laozi’s philosophy is indeed an objective principle of the universe that one can grasp with his or her intelligence; moreover, this principle itself doesn’t show any values. The “metaphysical Tao” in Zhuangzi’s philosophy is the process of change given by the creator, on which “human beings” have no room of influence and intervention. Human beings can only be aware of the fact of this “change;” as for the circumstances and details of this “change,” such as whether it has “principles” and “purposiveness” or not, are totally unknown to them. From these world-views and metaphysical assumptions, it’s obvious that Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s explanations about “human” and “being” and their philosophies about life are as different as the distinctions between “activeness” and “passiveness.” In Laozi’s opinions, according to the objective principle of the universe, human beings can retain their own “subjectivity;” therefore, their autonomous activities such as wills and intentions can be found basically meaningful. Human beings can employ the principle of “Tao” as a tool to fulfill their “wills” and “intentions” and thus set up several actions of ought-ness. In other words, Laozi approves the positive values of life and also acknowledges that one can take active actions toward the “world.” On the other hand, in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, the reality of “Tao” or “change” overwhelms all beings --including human beings—without any room of their participation or control. Under this circumstance, Zhuangzi also acknowledges that one has “subjectivity,” as the disturbances encountered in one’s in life originate exactly from the delusive attempt to control the “world” through this “subjectivity.” Consequently, one’s “subjectivity” and “actions of ought-ness” should be expressed in the intentions to annul the delusive actions, that is, the treatment of the “mind” so as to face candidly the reality of “change.” In other words, Zhuangzi’s passive approach to life is totally distinct from Laozi’s
More than seeing the fundamental and critical differences between Laozi and Zhuangzi, in this dissertation, we also point out: studying these differences not only enables us to have a profound understanding of their philosophies but also offers a frame of reference for the scholars of Chinese academic history to prevent them from applying, as a result of neglecting their differences, Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s propositions and theories indistinctively to the arguments of “Taoist philosophy.”

並列關鍵字

Laozi ； Zhuangzi ； Tao ； Origins ； Subjective State of Mind ； Subjectivity ； Ought-ness ； Mind

參考文獻

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