The main thesis of this paper is to show that one is warranted to assert p if and only if one knows p. I will apply Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge First Epistemology to argue for this thesis. Because human beings do communicate with each others by assertions, if this thesis holds then human beings communicate knowledge by assertions. In this way, Williamson’s Knowledge First Epistemology replies to the sceptical challenge which doubts knowledge is able to be communicated. Williamson proposed the notion of case in order to characterize a situation wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. In other words, one knows p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. Since one is warranted to assert p if and only if one knows p, one is warranted to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein that the condition that one knows p obtains. Incidentally, one must assert p only if one has suitable evidence, so that one is warranted to assert p if and only if one has suitable evidence. Since one is warranted to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains, one has evidence to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. This leads to the consequence that one’s evidence is one’s knowledge. In this thesis, I will demonstrate Williamson’s argument for the thesis that one’s evidence is one’s knowledge. Which case one is in determine one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. This suggests that a class of cases wherein the condition that one knows p obtains is a model of one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. In this thesis, I will indicate that Williamson provided such a elegant model for one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. In this model, we only need to assume that there is a class of cases wherein the condition that one knows p obtains.
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