2001年美國發生安隆(Enron)公司風暴,同時期台灣多家上市公司亦爆發大規模財務弊案,加上1997年之亞洲金融風暴,促成全球及台灣對於公司治理議題重視。且我國於2000年以來修正銀行法第74條,並通過金融機構合併法鼓勵同業間合併,促使各大型金融控股公司之誕生。而銀行業乃一國之金融中介,為資金供給與需求之橋樑,是故銀行業之公司治理著實為一重要課題。本文將以台灣銀行業為例,並利用美國統一金融機構評等制度(Uniform Financial Institution Rating System)所提出之CAMEL指標(Camel Rating)作為台灣銀行業之績效變數,探討各種公司治理變數如何影響銀行業在各項標準衡量下之表現。 本研究以2007至2012年32家台灣銀行為樣本,利用Panel Data模型探討公司治理變數(董監持股比例、董監質押比例、大股東持股比例、管理者持股比例、機構投資人持股比例、獨立董監占董監席次比)對於CAMEL指標各項變數(資本適足率、逾放比率、營業利益率、資產報酬率、流動比率)之影響。 實證結果可歸納如下: (1)董監持股比例、董監質押比例、大股東持股比例、機構投資人持股比例、獨立 董監占董監席次比皆與資本適足率呈現顯著正相關。 (2)董監持股比例、董監質押比例、大股東持股比例、獨立董監占董監席次比皆與 逾放比率呈現顯著負相關。 (3)董監質押比例、管理者持股比例、機構投資人持股比例、獨立董監占董監席次 比皆與營業利益率呈現顯著正相關;董監持股比例則與營業利益率呈現顯著負 相關。 (4)董監質押比例、管理者持股比例、機構投資人持股比例、獨立董監占董監席次 比皆與資產報酬率呈現顯著正相關;董監持股比例、大股東持股比例則與資產 報酬率呈現顯著負相關。 (5)董監質押比例、大股東持股比例、獨立董監占董監席次比皆與流動比率呈現顯著正相關;管理者持股比例則與流動比率呈現顯著負相關。
2001 Enron Corporation was revealed that its reported financial condition was sustained substantially by an institutionalized, systematic, and creatively planned accounting fraud, known since as the Enron scandal. At the same time, many Taiwan’s companies were found to have accounting fraud. According to this, Taiwan’s government paid more attention to Corporate Governance of financial industry. This paper is trying to find the relation between Corporate Governance and CAMEL rating system, which is used to decide the performance of financial company, of Taiwan’s banks. The conclusion of this paper shows that (1) The Director Shareholding ratio, Director Collateralization ratio, Major shareholder Shareholding ratio, Juristic person Shareholding ratio, the amount of Independent Director have a positive correlation with Bank of International Settlement ratio. (2) The Director Shareholding ratio, Director Collateralization ratio, Major shareholder Shareholding ratio, the amount of Independent Director have a negative correlation with Non-performing Loans ratio. (3) The Director Collateralization ratio, Supervisor Shareholding ratio, Juristic person Shareholding ratio, the amount of Independent Director have a positive correlation with Operating Profit Margin, the Director Shareholding ratio has a negative correlation with Operating Profit Margin. (4) The Director Collateralization ratio, Supervisor Shareholding ratio, Juristic person Shareholding ratio, the amount of Independent Director have a positive correlation with Return On Assets. The Director Shareholding ratio, Major shareholder Shareholding ratio, have a negative correlation with Return On Assets. (5) The Director Collateralization ratio, Major shareholder Shareholding ratio, Shareholding ratio, the amount of Independent Director have a positive correlation with Current Ratio. The Supervisor Shareholding ratio has a negative correlation with Current Ratio.