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  • 學位論文

重整公司之治理與扭轉策略之研究

A Study on Turnaround Strategy and Corporate Governance of Financial Distress Companies

指導教授 : 李吉仁

摘要


論文摘要 重整是法院之承審法官,以國家授與之權力,暫停公司債務履行,並選任重整人,及重整監督人,接掌公司經營,監督其進行過程,希望給遭遇財務困境之上市櫃公司,一個重生的機會。但近年之重整申請,常常成為債務人藉以賴債及繼續掏空之手法,而重整之過程又曠日費時。如果大環境不好、產業前景不佳、重整人能力不足、操守不佳,或公司治理無方,重整過程可能對債權人之權益造成更大之傷害,讓債權人最後清償金額,甚或低於一開始就執行破產清算之價值。 重整中的公司面臨之問題,比一般公司更多更複雜。經營人除了要在財務困難、內外交攻之情況下將公司救回,還要應付層出不窮的司法程序,以及債權人之糾纏。這時經營人受到的壓力及誘惑也更大,稍一不慎就會觸法或遭到名譽及身體傷害。此時不但不能因非常時期,資源不足而偏廢公司治理,反而更應以有限人力,戰戰兢兢充分落實治理制度。本研究旨在藉由探討兩家個案公司(耀文與雅新)的重整過程與公司治理問題,歸納影響重整成敗的重要因素,期望能從實務觀點提供未來修改重整法令與執行公司治理之參考。 重整公司之最主要治理組織及制度,已由法律嚴格規定,不能由經營人自由更改。公司法中規定,以重整人會議為經營者,以重整監督人會議為監督者來治理公司。但這種制度防弊有餘,開創不足,益增公司經營困難。本研究針對這些法制上的缺失,建議立法將重整監督人會議取消,使重整人會議具有與正常公司董事會完全相同之權責與功能,因而使重整人與公司所聘任之總經理、副總等經營人,能充分發揮功能,專心經營,而使公司能有機會脫困。 重整核准前,法官指定之臨時管理人、檢查人,以及重整過程中銀行或重整監督人會議指定之監控會計師,還有工會領袖、民意代表、稅務機關、縣市勞工局,都對重整公司之治理與營運有一定程度的影響,本研究也予以舉證分析並提出建議。 希望本研究結果能讓第一次面臨重整治理組織及制度的經理人,瞭解重整之遊戲規則與陷阱,避免落入相同之困局,而能事先思考應如何在這種既定之公司治理組織大架構下,以不同之執行技巧,走出一條活路。

並列摘要


THESIS ABSTRACT COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY NAME:Yang, Tsu-Kai MONTH/YEAR:Febuary 2009 ADVISER:Lee, Ji-Ren, Ph.D. A Study on Turnaround Strategy and Corporate Governance of Fiancial Distress Companies Corporate restructure is authorized and under supervision of jurisdiction court. However, this process often becomes a shield for debtors to avoid paying their debts. The whole process is lengthy and painful. Often time, it will further hurt the debtors. The net result after restructuring might make the residual value even lower than that of the starting point. Problem faced by a financial distress company is far more complicated than that of a normal company. Management need to deal with financial difficulty, and in the mean time, confront with many internal and external challenge, such as nasty negotiation with debtor, legal process, and most importantly, to put the company back to a right track. This study attempts to undertake an indepth study on two financial distress companies, Unicap and Yashin, and inductively conclude problematic areas in which amendments of current corporate law concerning corporate governance of financial distress companies shall be taken. In particular, what required by the section 10 of the current corporate law is very difficult for the new management team to follow and create their vision. The regulations are stiff and become a major obstacle for people who really want to do something. We suggest an amendment on the two-layer governance structure and empower the restructuring management team to turnaround the dying company timely. In addition, before the judge concludes a restructuring permission, he or she will apponit an accountant as legal inspector to examine the financial distress company and see if the company is of value to restructure and if the former management had commit malpractice. Once permitted, restructuring supervisor will hire an accountant to monitor the all the operational decisions made by the management team. Union leaders, legislator, tax officer, government officers will all jump in to take their pies which constitute a great interference to the management team to turnaround the company necessary quickly. Finally, our study provides some guidance for those who encounter financial distress situation. Implications for corporate governance and corporate turnaround are discussed.

參考文獻


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