通路商的掠奪性定價

Predatory Pricing in the Retailer Segment

蕭奕懷(Yi-Huai Hsiao)

指導教授 ： 馮勃翰

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.00538

摘要

本文探討下游零售商使用掠奪性定價, 阻擋潛在零售商進入市場的價格競爭策略會如何影響上游製造商最適批發價的訂定, 以及零售商跟製造商間的每單位產品利潤分成問題。
模型中的上游廠商為一具有獨佔力量的製造商, 然而其必須透過既存零售商將產品販賣給民眾, 而既存零售商面臨潛在零售商的競爭。
既存零售商可以選擇接受潛在零售商進入市場, 或是選擇採用掠奪性定價的策略, 阻擋其進入。
均衡狀態之下, 下游廠商所採用的掠奪性定價策略會迫使上游製造商必須配合將批發價格壓低, 並且會使得製造商於每單位產品能得到之利潤分成下降; 然而此行為可以減緩由於雙重邊際化所帶來的福利損失。

關鍵字

生產鏈 ； 下游廠商的進入問題 ； 掠奪性定價 ； 雙重邊際化

並列摘要

In this paper we analyze how price competition between retailers would reduce wholesale price and the distribution of profits between manufacturers and retailers.
In the model there is a monopoly manufacturer,
whose produce needs to be sold through an incumbent retailer, who faces potential competition from an entrant retailer.
The incumbent retailer may choose to accommodate the entry or use aggressive pricing to deter entry.
Our model thus incorporates entry deterrence behaviors into a vertical supply-chain model.
In equilibrium, entry deterrence executed by the incumbent retailer may repress the wholesale price of the manufacturer,
and curtails the shore of profits to manufacturer.
In addition, the predatory pricing taken by the downstream firm would alleviate the social welfare loss which results from the double-marginalization problem.

並列關鍵字

Supply chain ； Downstream entry ； Predatory pricing ； Double-marginalization

參考文獻

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