獨立董監事與公司績效關聯性之研究

Do Independent Directors and Supervisors Help Firm's Financial Performance?

洪顧紜(Ku-Yun Hung)

指導教授 ： 李存修

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.00398

摘要

無資料

關鍵字

獨立董監 ； 公司績效

並列摘要

Many commentators believe that the higher the percentage of independent directors and supervisors, the better the financial performance of firms. A competent authority in Taiwan requested that newly listed companies should hire independent directors and supervisors after February 22nd, 2002. However, the empirical results in this paper challenge the conventional point of view on this topic in the literature. And in addition, this study finds that the promulgation of the 2002 regulation has brought with it some negative effects.
First, the results of this study suggest that the percentage of independent directors and supervisors has a nonlinear relationship with firm performance. Second, the empirical findings of this study show that, affected by the new regulation, some bad companies that didn’t have to follow the new regulation will still voluntarily hire independent directors and supervisors in order to prevent investors from discovering their true quality. Finally, in this paper, we also find that the quality of the independent directors and supervisors is very important for firm performance and should be requested more completely and strictly to make sure that the monitoring mechanism of the firm really works.

並列關鍵字

Indepedent directors and supervisors ； Firm performance

參考文獻

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4. Cubbin, J. and D. Leech, 1986, “Growth Versus Profit-maximization: A Simultaneous-equations Approach to Testing the Marris Model,” Managerial and Decision Economics 7(2), 123-31.

5. Faccio, Mara and M. Ameziane Lasfer, 1999, “Managerial Ownership, Board Structure and Firm Value: The UK Evidence,” posted on http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=179008 (Social Science Research Network).