本研究旨在探討會計師是否會因為受查客戶支付低於或高於預期之審計公費,亦即異常審計公費,導致其獨立性受損,讓受查客戶管理當局有較大盈餘操縱的空間,進而影響審計品質。本研究以裁決性應計數(Discretionary Accruals)作為審計品質之代理變數,並進一步分析占事務所較高重要性之客戶,是否會使其具有議價能力,並對上述關聯性造成影響。最後,探討我國2006年證券交易法引進美國沙氏法案相關概念並修法後,對異常審公費與審計品質之關聯性是否產生影響。 本研究蒐集2002-2014年符合揭露公費規定之上市櫃公司,共10,708筆樣本資料中,存在負向異常審計公費之情況下,本研究發現會計師會因而折損其獨立性;反之,在存有正向異常審計公費之情況,則未發現此關聯性。此外,本研究並未發現客戶之議價能力會折損會計師之獨立性。最後,我國於2006年證券交易法修正後,使異常審計公費與裁決性應計數之關聯性下降,表示對於改善公司治理與增強會計師之獨立性,具正面之效果。
This study examines the relationship between audit quality (proxied by absolute value of discretionary accruals) and abnormal audit fees (i.e., the difference between actual audit fees and expected audit fees). This study further tests whether client’s importance to the audit firm affects the client’s bargaining power and thus damages the auditor’s independence. The thesis also investigates the impact of a regulatory change from the amendments of security laws in 2006 on the relationship between audit quality and abnormal audit fees. Using 10,708 samples collected during 2002 - 2014, the empirical results indicate a significantly negative relationship between abnormal audit fees and audit quality for the subsample of clients with negative abnormal fees. However, the empirical results show a statistically insignificant relationship for the subsample of clients with positive abnormal audit fees. Finally, the results also show that the negative relationship between abnormal fees and audit quality is moderated after the amendments of security laws in 2006.