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  • 學位論文

企業內部軟體開發資源使用競爭問題之解決機制設計

A Solution Mechanism Design for the Competition of In-house Application Development Services within a Corporation

指導教授 : 劉順仁
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摘要


在企業內設立軟體開發維護部門是當今現代化企業組織的普遍現象,其目的在於能以相較於外包或外購取得同級產品或服務的較低成本,得到較快的服務反應時間或服務品質,以增加企業的外部競爭力,使企業獲得投資的超額報酬。但為了得到軟體開發資源的使用權,經常在軟體部與需求部門間、及諸需求部門之間,發生競爭衝突;雖然一般多以申請服務的優先序與權威仲裁的方式配合內部支援計價機制來處理,不過對於軟體開發這種企業內的有限且稀有的資源的運用,卻仍未能達到使其效益極大化的目標。倘以投資效益來評估軟體部門的整體績效與存在價值,在實務上將面臨兩大挑戰:(一)投資的回收效益難以合理地數量化;(二)軟體開發部門大多以案件完成率或完成數與客戶滿意度來衡量績效,而不是採案件完成後對原需求單位產生的實質效益來衡量。 除了資源分配的困難外,另一個困擾供、需雙方的重大關鍵就是資訊不對稱,它使供、需雙方不能建立信任關係,也造成雙方無法達成各自期望的績效。因為供給方不知需求方的真正需求內容與預期達成目標,所以無從據以分配合理的必需資源給需求方,也造成在資源使用調度排程上的困難;而需求方則因不清楚軟體技術內容,難以具體說明工作細節、開出明確的技術規格,所以不能提供予對方明確的需求估計。 本研究應用2007年的諾貝爾經濟學獎得主之一Eric S. Maskin的機制設計理論,結合賽局理論與拍賣理論,設計一個解決企業內部軟體開發資源在使用上之競爭問題的方案。從本研究中,吾人得到四點結論:(1)解決企業內軟體開發資源的使用競爭問題的機制是存在的;(2)密封式動態加價競標拍賣機制是解決此問題的有效方法;(3)競標拍賣機制使資源的公評價值得以彰顯;(4)此種解決機制可應用於處理其他類似的問題。

並列摘要


The set up of an in-house application development & maintenance service division is being commonly used in most recent modern enterprises. Time & cost efficient are essential, comparing to out-sourcing or purchasing 3rd party services. It is expected to increase the competitiveness and have a much higher ROI. However, in order to gain more resources in application development service, conflict of interest is always existing between the service provider and the requester; although normally it will be defined as a first come first serve basis or a top down decision to allocate the manpower, no matter what it is, the performance of the application development service unit is not optimal. You will face two challenges if you measure the application development division performance by using ROI method. (1) The return of investment can not be reasonably quantified, (2) The application division, instead of evaluating the actual benefit that will bring to the requesters, uses the completion rate of projects or customer satisfaction survey to define their key performance factors. Besides the difficulties of resource allocation, information asymmetry is another main threat to the both sides. Lack of trust will also damage both parties. Since the service requesters are not expected to be as professional as the service provider in application development, the requesters can not clearly draw the pictures of their requirements. Given the circumstances of not knowing the actual needs and expectations, the service provider can not reasonably allocate the necessary and sufficient corresponding resources to meet the requirements, and a conflict of agenda will be caused. This paper is basically based on Mr. Eric S. Maskin’s (one of the 2007 Noble Price Winner in Economics) mechanism design theory, and also included game theory and auction theory to present a solution that can overcome the current issues when having resources allocation. As a result, I have come up with four conclusions: (1)The mechanism of solving resource allocation in application development division does exist, (2)Sealed ascending bid is an effective mechanism to solve this problem, (3)Resources can be fairly evaluated through bidding mechanism, (4)This mechanism can be applied to other similar issues.

參考文獻


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