我國股利發放相關問題探討兼論2012年公司法修正

Discussion of Issues related to Dividend Payments on the Companies Act And the 2012 Amendments

楊景琇(Ching-Hsiu Yang)

指導教授 ： 王文宇

共同指導教授 ： 蔡英欣

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.10403

摘要

公司每年的股利發放牽涉公司營運方向、股東利益及公司債權人、員工等等相關人之利益，是公司一年辛勞之成果展現，更是所有人檢視公司經營之年終大檢查，藉由公司財務報表之提供，股利發放議案之提出，股東可以有所檢視並評估公司之經營團隊究竟對公司一年之營運有何貢獻，是否確實落實主管機關法規，有無暗自進行投機炒作歪風，或是否有人正進行內線交易。這些都可透過公司當年之股利發放一窺究竟，然為使企業自主，我國對此立法並未著墨太多。但2012年在公司治理原則之注入下，我國公司法的確產生變化，不論是公積金使用之放寬，或是公司董事對股東之資訊公開方面，現行第183條股東會議決事項、第230條之各項表冊之分發義務，亦得以公告之方式，且股東會議記錄之製作，尚得以電子方式製作，資訊傳達股東更快速且便利。
既然我國公司法規定股利分派為股東會及董事會共享之權限，但股東現僅可事後對董事會提出之盈餘分派議案為提案之承認與否，這種僅事後表示意見之單方承認，是否對股東屬最佳之保障及符合共享權設計之立法目的，不無疑問。又既然股東可以事後承認與否，但相關資訊之揭露，我國立法並無任何相關規定，目前僅規範公司董事會提出相關表冊即足，然健全嚴格之信息披露制度確實是防止上市公司大股東及經營團隊侵佔公司利益，保護大眾投資者之重要手段，我國公司法如此未予股東對盈餘提案事前表達意見，事中未予完善之資訊揭露保障，最終卻又要求股東做出盈餘分派之承認，有點變相等同股東實則必須接受董事盈餘分派議案之結論，與當初所謂盈餘分派權應屬共享權之設計相背。從而就資訊揭露權這部分，在資訊觀測站或許投資人可以得到訊息，但並無強制規定規定公司應揭露有關如何發放股利之過程即公司如何做出本年度股利政策之相關決定因素，公司之經營方向究竟為何等，因此本文即就投資人之權益，應如何以立法保護規範、促進發展並兼顧公司債權人之保障加以探討。

關鍵字

股利發放 ； 資訊揭露 ； 共享權 ； 股利政策 ； 債權人保護

並列摘要

The issued dividend payment is related to the direction of the company’s operation, and the interests of the shareholders, the creditors of the company and the staff, etc, which is also the year of the fruits of the company employees’ labor. Moreover, it is the year-end inspection of the company’s operation which comes under everyone’s review. Through the provided company's financial statements and the proposed motion of dividend payment, the shareholders can review and assess whether the company's management team make any contribution to the company’s operation in the whole year, whether the authorities actually implement the regulations or not? Did they carry out unhealthy speculation hype secretly or did someone conduct insider trading?
All the phenomenon mentioned above can be learned through the dividend payment issued that year. Nevertheless, in order to let the enterprise keep autonomous, our legislation does not dwell on this too much. But in 2012, under the input of the principles of corporate governance, our country’s Company Law did make a change. For example, not only the relaxing use of the public fund, the aspects about how the board directors of the company disclose the information to the shareholders, but the existing 183 Provision of the issues about the shareholders' meeting decision, and 230 Provision about the distribution obligations of the lists should be communicated by way of announcement. What’s more, the minutes of the shareholders' meeting should be taken by way of electronic. Thus, conveying information to the shareholders by way of electronic is more quickly and conveniently. Since our country’s company laws regulate that the distribution of dividend payment is the share privilege of the shareholders and the Board, yet currently only after the Board proposes the motion of the issued distribution of the stock surplus, then the shareholders can express whether they recognize it or not. As a result, isn’t it without any doubt that this unilateral recognition of the opinion is the best guarantee to the shareholders and meets the legislative intent of sharing the rights together? Furthermore, since the shareholders may subsequently recognize it or not, yet there are no relevant legislative provisions about the disclosure of the information. Currently, the government only regulates the Board of the directors to propose the relevant information. Nevertheless, the sound strict system of information disclosure is to prevent the major shareholders of listed companies and operating team from encroaching the company's interests and it’s also an important means of protecting the public investors. Our country’s Company Law doesn’t allow the shareholders to express their opinions about the proposal of the surplus in advance. Later on, there are no comprehensive measures of protection toward information disclosure, and eventually, the Law requires the shareholders to recognize the distribution of the surplus. Such policy decision is disguisedly equivalent to the fact that actually, the shareholders must accept the conclusions of the motion about the issued proceeds. Nevertheless, this is quiet contrary to the original design about the right of sharing the surplus. As for the right of information disclosure, probably, the investors can get the message at the Observation Post, but there is no mandatory requirement on how companies should disclose the process of the dividend payment. That is, there’s no company's dividend policy on how the company makes the relevant determinants of the current year and what’s the company's operating directions, etc. Therefore, this thesis is going to discuss the interests of the investors and how to make laws to protect regulations and prompt the development and guarantee of the creditors of the company as well.

並列關鍵字

Dividend Payout ； Information Disclosure ； Sharing Rights ； Dividend Policy ； Creditor Protection

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