內生提案者的議事規則及平均分配

EGALITARIAN PAYOFF DISTRIBUTION IN LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING WITH 3 PLAYERS AND ENDOGENOUS AGENDA SETTERS

施正祐(Cheng-Yu Shih)

指導教授 ： 馮勃翰

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201602603

摘要

本文提出了一個動態三人集體決策模型，其中反對現狀者將會在下一期被賦予提案權。我們找到了一個的均衡，於該均衡路徑上，提案者會隨機的挑選餘下的任一人並形成聯盟。該聯盟能持續至無限期，同時成員間會公平地分配所有資源。

關鍵字

集體決策 ； 提案權 ； 聯盟 ； 公平

並列摘要

In this article we propose a collective decision making model in a dynamic environment with 3 players and the political rule that only gives the agenda-setting power in the next period to those who vote against the current status quo when first time it took effect. We show that, in equilibrium we derive, the agenda setter will randomly choose his supporter to form a minimum winning coalition which could carry on forever and the payoff distribution among that coalition is egalitarian and fair in some cases.

並列關鍵字

collective decision making ； agenda-setting power ； coalition ； egalitarian

參考文獻

[2] Diermeier, Daniel and Pohan Fong. 2011. ”Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2): 947-985.

[3] Knight, Brian. 2005. ”Estimating the Value of Proposal Power.”American Economic Review, 95: 1639-1652.

[4] Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. ”Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo.”Public Choice, 33(4): 27-43.

References

[1] Baron, David P. and John Ferejohn. 1989. ”Bargaining in Legislatures.”American Political Science Review, 83(4): 1181-1206.