四次元論的合理性及其限度

Critical Study of Four-Dimensionalism

許樹和(Shu-He Shiu)

指導教授 ： 楊金穆

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.10539

摘要

本文旨於(1)評估各種四次元論，並比較何種版本的四次元最合理; (2) 指出四次元論的局限，說明何以四次元論目前尚不是關於事物歷經變化而持存的主流理論。

第一章介紹三次元論與四次元之間的爭辯，並點出爭辯的焦點在於是否接受事物具有「時間部分」。三次元論者主張事物只有空間上的部分，沒有時間上的部分。四次元論者則持相反看法。Peter van Inwagen認為這場爭辯只是字面之爭，沒有實質意涵。Theodor Sider則論證這場爭辯是場有意義的辯論。

第二章介紹「時空蟲理論」，並評價該理論的優缺點。時空蟲理論可以充分解釋事物的變化與續存，但會面臨無法正常指稱、計數事物的問題，並且會不得不承認同一空間區域會有多數（甚至無限多）事物同時存在的現象。

第三章介紹「階段論」，並評價該理論的優缺點。作為時空蟲理論的改良版本，階段論是目前為止最成功的四次元論。

第四章則指出關於四次元論的疑慮。嘗試提出改良階段論的可能方向。

關鍵字

時間部分 ； 四次元論 ； 時空蟲論 ； 階段論 ； 時間哲學

並列摘要

My MA thesis has two tasks: (1) evaluate different versions of four-dimensionalism in market, chose the best four-dimensioanlsim, and justified my choice. (2) specify the unease concern about four-dimensionalism. These concerns is why four-dimensionalism is not a well-accepted metaphysical doctrine today. It seems to my that if there is a version of four-dimensionalism that can ease or resolve these concerns, four-dimensionalism, compare to its rival, i.e., three-dimensionalism, will be a dominate metaphysical doctrine regarding to the issue of persistence.
In Chapter 1 I briefly introduce the debate between three- and four-dimensionalism and point out the core of this debate is about the acceptance of temporal parts. Four-dimensionslist belive that by appealing to temporal parts many traditional metaphysical problems or paradox can be solved or avoided. However, there is debate bout whether the debate about temporal part is verbal dispute or real. Peter van Inwagen claims that this debate is verbal but Theodor sider argues that the debates is real. And then I introduce several reasons in favor of four-dimenstionalism; some of them is about the definition and others about famous traditional metaphysical problem or paradox.
In Chpater 2 I evaluate the strengthens and weakness of the first version of four-dimensionalism—worm theory. It is interesting that no one calls herself worm theorist explicitly in literature while there are so many philosophers implicitly holding this view that it is the first four-dimensionalism that comes into three-dimensionalists’ minds. I shall state what I mean by ‘worm theory’ in the first section. In the due two sections I shall address how the metaphysical problems mentioned in chapter 1, the problem of change and the paradox of material coincidence, can be response or solved in the worm view. These addresses will demonstrate the strengthens of worm theory in comparison to three-dimensionalism. In the fourth section I shall offer three critics to the worm theory; these critics consist of the weakness of the worm theory and point out the possibility of an alternative version of four-dimensionalism.
In Chpater 3 I evaluate the strengthens and weakness of the other version of four-dimensionalism—stage theory. Here I introduce Sider’s stage theory; I shall in what aspect stage theory is the different version of four-dimensionalism and how this new theory can have the benefit of worm theory without facing its problems in the meantime. In this sense stage theory is the best four-diemensionalism so far.
In Chpater 4 I elaborate my two concerns about four-dimensionalism, in particular, stage theory. One is about the underlying supposition of stage theory; the other is about the significance of accepting stage theory. In the end I conclude that these concerns will indicate the how stage theory should be modified in the future.

並列關鍵字

Temporal parts ； four-dimensionalism ； worm theory ； stage theory ； philosophy of time

參考文獻

Armstrong, D. M., 1980, “Identity Through Time”, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause, Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 67–78.

Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1997, “Why Constitution is not Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, 94: 599–621.

Barker, S. and Dowe, P., 2003, “Paradoxes of Multi-Location”, Analysis, 63: 106-14.

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Baxter, D., 1989, “Identity Through Time and the Discernibility of Identicals”, Analysis, 49: 125–31.