產能清算、財務契約與異業合併

Capacity Liquidation, Financial Contracts, and Conglomerate Mergers

陳之浩(Chih-Hao Chen)

指導教授 ： 陳其美

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.01397

摘要

本論文探討廠商的外部融資與其產品市場競爭行為，如何透過財務契約中的產能清算要求相互影響。產能清算對於廠商在產品市場競爭有兩種效果：一、減少廠商未來最大可能的生產量，二、降低產能價格。這兩者都會使對手廠商更有意願大量生產，增加競爭者的獲利，也因此讓潛在的進入者更容易進入產業。故產能清算雖能提高廠商的短期收益，但對長期在產品市場的獲利有負面影響。不僅如此，產能清算可能因為造成更多競爭者進入產業，使得廠商在產品市場的獲利波動性增加，產生財務契約的代理問題。當廠商獲利在財務契約中無法被驗證，不穩定的未來獲利可能讓投資人無法損益兩平，因而不願意出錢投資。為了使投資人願意投資，廠商必須透過調整產能清算的規模，增加能夠保證給投資人的未來收益，本文證明過度清算以及清算不足都可能達到此目的。廠商最適財務契約的清算規模將取決於市場環境，如產能價格、產品需求、產業進入成本等；而廠商簽訂的財務契約，也會透過契約中的產能清算要求影響未來的產品市場競爭。當廠商為了得到外部融資，改變其清算規模所造成的不效率，其實可以視為廠商的融資成本。由於文獻中指出企業合併後的內部資本市場，有助於緩解廠商的財務限制，因而本文推論異業合併對整體的清算效率性有正面影響。最後，根據異業合併、財務契約、產能清算的理論，本文對於美國一九八零年代併購潮的實證現象提出一個理論的解釋。

關鍵字

產能 ； 資產清算 ； 財務契約 ； 代理問題 ； 有限保證 ； 異業合併

並列摘要

This thesis studies the interaction between the external financing and the product market competition of an incumbent firm through the capacity liquidation. The liquidation of the production capacity diminishes not only the firm’s maximum production level, but also the capacity price. Both effects encourage the rivals to behave more aggressively and promote entry. Therefore, capacity liquidation increases the short term liquidation income but declines the long term profits from the product market competition. Moreover, the capacity liquidation may intensify the agency problems in financial contracts because the profits become more volatile after new entry occurs. When the states of profits are unverifiable in financial contracts, the uncertain future income may make the investors unable to breakeven. To make the contract feasible, the firm should increase the pledgeable income by changing the liquidation level. I show that both over liquidation and under liquidation may increase the total pledgeable income. The liquidation level in the optimal contract depends on market environments. After the firm designs the contract, the contract conversely affects the market competition through the capacity decision. Finally, I consider the conglomerate merger with efficient internal capital markets, which mitigates firms’ financial constraints and hence improves the efficiency of the liquidation decision. This theory provides an explanation for the US merger wave in 1980s.

並列關鍵字

Capacity ； Asset Liquidation ； Financial Contracts ； Agency Problems ； Limited Pledgeability ； Conglomerate Mergers

參考文獻

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