用經濟學實驗研究資訊傳遞賽局在司法不確定性下的極端（與非極端）懲罰

Extreme (and Non-Extreme) Punishments in Sender-Receiver Games with Judicial Error: An Experimental Investigation

馮孟章(Meng-Jhang Fong)

指導教授 ： 王道一

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201602956

摘要

我們在離散型的Crawford and Sobel (1982)資訊傳遞賽局加入將事後懲罰及司法不確定性進行控制實驗。在此賽局中，知道真實狀態的傳訊者會傳遞一個不具拘束力的訊息給制定政策的接收者；執行政策後，接收者會觀察到跟真實狀態高度相關、但可能有誤的信號，並據以決定是否付出成本懲罰傳訊者。我們改變懲罰強度，由弱（微不足道）、強（具威嚇性）至極端（可能失去所有報酬）；在極端懲罰下，我們也改變接收者的信號不確定性。我們發現懲罰強度越強，接收者越不會懲罰傳訊者，表示他們在考慮誤罰老實人及錯放說謊者之間的權衡。更重要的是，即使懲罰不見得讓傳訊者更誠實，但它依然促使接收者更信任訊息，進而增進整體資訊傳遞。

關鍵字

策略性訊息傳遞 ； 說謊 ； 極刑 ； 監督不完全 ； 經濟學實驗

並列摘要

We conduct an experiment which incorporates ex post punishment and judicial uncertainty into the discrete sender-receiver game of Crawford and Sobel (1982), where a knowledgeable sender sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver who determines a policy action. After taking this action, the receiver observes a noisy signal of the true state and can impose a costly punishment on the sender. We vary the strength of punishment from mild (nominal), strong (deterrent) to extreme (potential of losing everything), and vary receiver’s signal uncertainty when punishment is extreme. We find that receivers punish less as the strength of punishment increases, which suggests a trade-off between wrongly punishing innocent senders and not being able to punish liars. More importantly, punishment encourages receivers to trust senders more and thus improves the information transmission, even though senders need not become more truthful .

並列關鍵字

Strategic Information Transmission ； Lying ； Death Penalty ； Monitoring Uncertainty ； Laboratory Experiment

參考文獻

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