自由主義之爭：拉茲對自由主義中立性之完善論批判

A Debate in Liberalism：On Raz’s Perfectionism Critique of Liberal Neutrality

鄭楷立(Kai-Li Cheng)

指導教授 ： 葉浩

共同指導教授 ： 蕭高彥(Carl K.Y. Shaw)

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.01756

摘要

當代社會之價值多元處境，使得政治社群的正當性備受質疑。面對政治秩序正當性的崩解，部分自由主義者（以羅爾斯為主）認為國家必須在眾多善觀念之中，保持中立，如此才能公正地對待每一位公民。這樣的立場也稱作反完善論，亦即國家不應該基於某個特殊善觀念的內在優越性而採取政治行動。但另一方面，在政治場域中排除善觀念的中立途徑遭受諸多批評。
　　英國自由主義者和多元論者的拉茲便批判中立國家，拉茲期望建立一套以社群為主的自由主義理論。拉茲認為自由主義必須在政治場域中提倡自由主義的價值，這樣的立場稱為（國家）完善論或是自由主義完善論。拉茲的自由主義完善論以個人自主和價值多元為核心，個人自主要求充分的選擇範圍，基於自主的義務要求國家提供個人充分的選擇範圍，據此，個人自主要求價值多元。相對於自由主義中立論，自由主義完善論要求在政治場域中提倡自由主義的理念。
　　國家保持中立和國家基於自由主義價值而行動，是兩種彼此矛盾的理念。金里卡將中立論與完善論的語彙轉化為社會完善論與國家完善論的爭議，完善論本身沒有錯誤，問題在於政治場合中該不該採用某個完善論作為國家行動根據；金里卡認為社會完善論與國家完善論之間不分軒輊（雖然他偏向前者）。而本文認為，國家行動與否的爭議是虛假的，兩種矛盾的理念出自於雙方自主觀的差異，根據不同的自主觀會得出不同的國家行動主張。而本文認為，強調個人選擇優先的自主觀和社會完善論（或國家中立論）是一致的，而強調社會論題的自主觀和國家完善論（或自由主義完善論）是一致的。
　　回到當代社會價值多元處境來檢視自由主義中立論和自由主義完善論，本文認為中立論未能作到國家中立，因為中立國家的理據在價值多元處境中備受質疑。據此，兩種試圖回應當代社會價值多元處境的自由主義理論，本文認為自由主義不得不走向完善論那方。

關鍵字

自由主義 ； 自由主義中立性 ； 完善主義 ； 拉茲 ； 價值多元論

並列摘要

Contemporary plural societies have shaken the legitimacy of political community. Facing the collapse of legitimacy of political order, some liberals advocate that state should be neutral among many conceptions of good in order to treat every citizens fairly. The idea is also called: anti-perfectionism, which means state should not act due to the inner superiority of a particular conception of good. However, the neutrality approach which excludes the conception of good in political fields has arisen many critiques.

Joseph Raz, a British liberal and also a pluralist, criticizes the idea of neutral state, and he endeavors to build a non-individual liberalism. Raz thinks liberalism has to advocate liberal values in political fields. This position is called: state perfectionism or liberal perfectionism. Personal autonomy and value pluralism are central ideas in Raz’s liberal perfectionism. Personal autonomy requires adequate choices and opportunities. The autonomy-based duty asks state to provide its citizens with adequate choices and opportunities. Therefore, Personal autonomy requires value pluralism. Contrary to liberal neutralism, liberal perfectionism advocates liberal values in political fields.

Liberal neutralism and liberal perfectionism are contradictory to each other. Will Kymlicka transfers the debate between liberal neutralism and liberal perfectionism into the debate between social perfectionism and state perfectionism. The crucial point is not about perfectionism but whether we should adopt perfectionism for the reasons of state actions. In kymlicka’s opinion, there still left a decisive point for favoring each of them. Nevertheless, in my view, behind the false controversy between social perfectionism and state perfectionism, the real conflict is the divided conceptions of autonomy. Also, the conception of autonomy which emphasizes the priority of self-determination is coherent to social perfectionism, while that emphasizes the priority of social thesis is coherent to state perfectionism.

Backing to contemporary plural societies to examine liberal neutralism and liberal perfectionism, both of them fail to resolve the issue of value pluralism. Especially, liberal neutralism fails in justifying itself in neutral ground forces liberals to adopt the perfectionism approach.

並列關鍵字

Liberalism ； Liberal Neutrality ； Perfectionism ； Raz ； Value Pluralism

參考文獻

葉浩，2011，〈價值多元論與自由主義─兼論伯林的政治理論方法論〉，《政治與社會哲學評論》，39:59-111。

Jones, Peter. 1989.“The Ideal of Neutral State.”In Liberal Neutrality, eds. Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve. London abd New York：Routlege, 9-38.

Waldron, Jeremy. 1989b. “Legislation and Moral Neutrality.” In Liberal Neutrality, eds. Robert Goodin and Andrew Reeve. London abd New York：Routlege, 61-83.

Bellamy R., and M. Hollis, 1999. “Consensus, Neutrality and Compromise.”In Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality, edited by Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis. London; Portland, Or. : Frank Cass, 54-78.

Gardbaum, S. 1996. “ Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict.” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jan., 1996): 385-417.