茱蒂斯・巴特勒的主體理論——權力、心理與承認

The Subject Theory of Judith Butler：Power, Psyche and Recognition

董佳豪(Chia-Hao Dong)

指導教授 ： 莊世同

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201700134

摘要

摘要

本論文試圖透過閱讀茱蒂斯・巴特勒（Judith Butler）的著作，來探討規範與主體之間複雜的關係。這些探討將說明，對規範的思考不能忽略權力以及主體心理（psyche）的面向，且同時涉及了關於承認的倫理問題。在本文第二章中，透過對傅柯、阿圖塞、佛洛伊德等人的理論，巴特勒指出，規範不只限制或規制著主體的行動，規範更根本地賦予主體的形成。主體與規範的關係，並不只是主體透過反身的意識，自由地思考著規範與自身，而是更有可能在無意識的、欲望的層次受到規範的規制，導致主體對規範深刻的臣服。

承接著傅柯對主體的說明，巴特勒認為，雖然規範是主體形成的前提條件，但規範並未完全決定了主體，或消滅了主體的能動性。在第三章中，透過對「展演」（performative）概念的說明將指出，係透過規範實踐的重複，規範的合法性與正當性本身才由此回溯地建立，這種觀點指出了合法性並非預先存在，且必須依靠未來的規範實踐來維持，從而質疑該規範合法性的普遍與穩固的地位。同時，正是因為規範需要透過重複的展演來維持，這個運作的結構反而提供了改變規範的契機。透過對規範的意義與合法性的重新意指（resignification），在這之中主體的能動性也得以產生，展演因此成為規範能夠持續但也受到挑戰的場所。

此外，巴特勒對主體的思考也擴及到主體與他者之間的倫理關係，以及生命的政治處境。在本文第四章中，巴特勒提供了一種「剝奪」（dispossession）的主體觀，此種主體並非是自給自足、完全理解或掌握自身的，相反地它指出，主體在形成之初便依賴他人的刺激與保護、依賴語言與規範領域的承認，並且，生命的存活本身也需仰賴物質條件的支持。此種主體並非是以自身為當然基礎的「主權主體」（sovereign subject），它的生命與存在處於與他者的關聯性之中，而無法與他者分隔。正是因為依賴於他者、規範與其他存活的基本條件，巴特勒指出，生命在本體論上是岌岌可危的（precarious），社會規範與制度的支持，是維繫生命適存性（livability）的政治條件。然而，由於承認的規範框架不均地分配了不同生命遭受暴力的可能性，批判這些規範框架因此成為了重要的倫理議題。巴特勒認為，非暴力的可能性在於對面他者受苦或岌岌可危的「臉龐」（face）時，所經歷的焦慮感與張力，這些感受作用在主體身上，撼動著主體去採取行動。此種回應他者的形式意味著主體在剝奪中的倫理能動性（ethical agency），主體的感受與接受的能力，將成為主體政治或倫理行動的前提條件與構成的特質。

關鍵字

茱蒂斯・巴特勒 ； 主體 ； 規範 ； 展演 ； 承認 ； 岌岌可危的生命 ； 剝奪

並列摘要

ABSTRACT

Through a close reading of the works from Judith Butler, this essay attempts to investigate the complicated relations between norms and subjects. Those relations will show that, we cannot think about the normative without the power at work and the psychic dimention of the subjects. Besides, this question also relates to the ethics of recognition. In chapter 2, through the theories of Foucault, Althusser and Freud and so on, Butler claims that norms not only limit or regulate the conducts of subjects, but also conditon the formation of the subjects. Further, the relation between norms and subjects cannot be reduced to the subject whose consciousness reflects on the norm and itself freely. Already in its unconsciousness and desire, the subject is regulated by norms, which results in the subject’s passionate subjection to the norms.

Following Foucault’s formulation of the subject, Butler points that although the norms condition or produce the formation of the subject, this doesnot mean that the subject is determined by the norms, which assumes that there is no agency of the subject. Chapter 3, through the notion of the performative, suggests that the legitimacy of the norms is instated retroactively by the repetitions of the practices of the norms. In this view, on one hand, the legitimacy is not prior to that operation of repetitions; rather, it can only sustain itself by the practices of the norms in the future, which contested its universal and fixed status. On the other hand, it is precisely the norms requiring its performative repetitions that this structure provides a chance to question or to resignify the norms. Where the actions out of the prediction of the norms take place, the agency located within the practices of resignigication of the norm shows up. The Performative thus becomes the field where the efficiencies of the norms both continue and are challenged.

Moreover, Butler’s thoughts on subject also involve the ethical relations between subjects and the Other as well as the political condition of life. In chapter 4, I will turn to subjects of “dispossession”, a conception offers by Butler, which is not considered as self-sufficent, self-transparent or self-controlled. Otherwise, according to Butler, subjects are primarily formed in the dependency on stimulations and protections from others and on the recognition in language and norms. Besides, their survivals also rely on material conditions. In her view, this subject is not a “sovereign subject” who takes itself as a granted ground and its life and being remain in relationality with and cannot be separated from the Other independently. Based precisely on this feature of depending on and opening to the Other, norms and other infrastructure, Butler argues that the ontological status of life is itself precarious. The recognitions and requirements supported by social norms and institutes are the political condtions to sustain the libvability of livies. However, because the norms of recognition allocate the vulnerability and the injuries from violence differently between livies around the globe, it becomes all the more important an ethical task to cirtize those normative frames. Butler suggests that the possibility of non-violence lies in the anxiety and tension undergone when we encounter the “face” of the Other in suffering and precarity, which acts upon the subject and the subjet is moved to act. This form of responsiveness implies an ethical agency in the dispossession of the subject, whose senses and receptivity become a precondition for political or ethical action and its constituent feature.

並列關鍵字

Judith Butler ； subject ； norms ； performative ； recognition ； precarious life ； dispossession

參考文獻

_________. 1980. Power/Knowledge : selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977. Translated by Colin Gordon. Edited by Colin Gordon. Harlow : Pearson Education

2000c. ‘Politics, Power and Ethics：A Discussion Between Judith Butler and William Connolly’. In Theory & Event vol.4.2

Lloyd, Moya. 2007. Judith Butler : from norms to politics. Cambridge ; Malden, MA : Polity

Benjamin, Walter. 1996. Walter Benjamin Selected Writings Vol.1 1913-1926. Edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press.

_________. 1983. “The Subject and Power” In Michel Foucault, beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, with an afterword by and an interview with Michel Foucault, 208-226. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.