個別化行銷下的最適折價券與產品線設計

The Optimal Couponing Strategy and Product Line Design under Individual Marketing

戴翊亘(Yi-Hsuan Dai)

指導教授 ： 周善瑜

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2004.00895

摘要

本研究旨在以賽局理論探討「低端產品」折價券的發行對產品線設計的影響。廠商可依是否使用區辨消費者的能力而選擇發行「大眾折價券」或「個別化折價券」。兩者皆有助於緩和產品線競蝕問題，前者的緩和能力受到消費者使用折價券的成本大小影響，後者則可有效提升產品售價，但具有辨識錯誤的風險。本文在假設高端消費者具有較高的品質偏好及折價券使用成本下，獲致如下結果：

一、當折價券使用成本很高時宜採大眾折價券，可無辨認風險地使產品售價及品質均達效率水準；當使用成本較小時，廠商辨識力較大宜採個別化折價券，反之則採大眾折價券。

二、大眾折價券的最適面額可能恰為高端消費者使用成本或與低端品質有關，但個別化折價券最適面額乃根據低端品質設定。

三、非整合通路下，當高端消費者使用成本較高時，製造商宜引導零售商發行大眾折價券，批發價格及產品品質可以逐步提高，甚至非整合通路的雙層產品線競蝕問題可獲得解決。

四、當折價券使用成本小或零售商辨識力較大時，製造商宜引導零售商發行個別化折價券，反之則引導其發行大眾折價券。

五、引導零售商發行個別化折價券相對於大眾折價券更能改善零售商誘因問題，因此製造商可能在整合通路時大眾折價券為最適策略的辨識力水準下，反而引導零售商發行個別化折價券。

關鍵字

折價券 ； 差別取價 ； 產品線設計 ； 個別化行銷

並列摘要

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of issuing a coupon attached to a low-end product at the retail level on the manufacturer’s profits and its product line design. The manufacturer can choose to issue a mass coupon to all consumers, or an individual coupon targeted at low-valuation consumers. The mass coupon can help alleviate the cannibalization problem in the product line but its effect is limited by the magnitude of the redemption cost of the high-valuation consumers. The individual coupon serves to extract the surplus of the high segment at the expense of mistargeting. Assuming high-valuation consumers incur a higher cost when redeeming coupons than low-valuation consumers, we find the following results:

(i) When the redemption cost of the high segment is high enough, the mass coupon allows the firm to implement perfect price discrimination, thus setting the prices and the quality levels of products at the highest possible levels.

(ii) Unlike the mass coupon, the value of which may equal the redemption cost of the high segment, the optimal value of the individual coupon always increases with the quality level of the low-end product.

(iii) In a non-integrated channel, the higher the redemption cost of the high segment, the more the mass retail coupon helps alleviate the cannibalization problem and thus the retailer’s incentive problems, which in turn increases the manufacturer’s profits until the integrated profits can be achieved.

(iv) If the consumers’ redemption cost is lower or the retailer’s targetability is sufficiently high, the manufacturer is better to induce the retailer to issue the individual coupon.

(v) The individual coupon alleviates the retailer’s
incentive problems to a greater extent than the mass coupon does. Thus the manufacturer may prefer inducing the individual coupon to inducing the mass coupon despite the opposite is true in an integrated channel.

並列關鍵字

Individual marketing ； Coupon ； Product line design ； Price discrimination

參考文獻

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