法律權力與授權規範

Legal Power and Power-conferring Norm

林中鶴(Chung-He Lin)

指導教授 ： 顏厥安

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.01895

摘要

權力與規範是一組在政治哲學與法理論中都很重要的概念，而在法理論的領域內主要是通過法的觀點來提出對這對概念的理解，在那裡問題就呈現為法律權力、授權規範與它們彼此之間關係的問題。

在英語世界中，以Hofheld為始雖然很早已經展開對法律權力的概念分析工作，不過一般認為要等到Bentham的《On laws in General》出版以後，我們才擁有對法律權力概念相對完整而徹底的討論。另外，Kelsen也從純粹法學的理論立場，對法律權力概念提出過相當精彩的闡述；Spaak則是從分析法學的理論立場，對法律權限概念進行完整而詳盡的整理。本論文因此是先從整理這三位理論家的觀點起手，再從法律權力的內外側面對法律權力從事初步刻劃。

而本論文認為，無論法律權力是否必然來自規範，對法律權力的完整理解不能夠獨立於規範，其中最主要的當然就是授權規範。為了徹底解明授權規範的性質，本論文首先考察何謂規範的功能，並在此一視角下逐一分析Hart、von Wright與Searle對於規範種類的論述。在前述研究的基礎上，本論文主張授權規範在規範的功能、意義的面向上都顯示出不能化約為義務規範的獨立性質，甚至也無法化約為容忍意義的許可規範。相對地，本論文建議我們有可能可以從承諾意義的許可規範來為授權規範找到一個適當的理論定位。

本論文的主要論旨在於，在一方面，法律權力的本質是一種技術，是通過授權規範所建立起的化約複雜性的機制；另一方面，授權規範卻不能夠化約為義務規範，也不能夠化約為容忍意義的許可規範，傾向與實質的價值和利益產生連繫。這似乎在提醒我們，從人民服從法律的義務這個觀點出發，授權規範不僅在性質上獨立於義務規範，似乎也在重要性上優先於義務規範。

關鍵字

法律權力 ； 法律權限 ； 規範 ； 授權規範 ； 授與權力規範 ； 義務規範 ； 課與義務規範

並列摘要

Power and norm is an significant pair of concepts in both political philosophy and legal theory. In the realm of legal theory, this pair of concepts is mainly represented as the query of the concept of legal power, power-conferring norm, and their correlation from the perspective of the legal.

In Anglophone areas, Hofheld is the first one who dealt with the conceptual study of the concept of legal power, but it is not until Bentham that man can get comparatively comprehensive picture and insight of the concept of legal power. Besides, Kelsen, who stands firm in the stance of pure theory of law, also offers a excellent theoretical description of it; Spaak, instead, offers a rather complete and thorough discussion as to the explication of it. This thesis, therefore, from investigating the theoretical conceptions of legal power suggested by the above three scholars, tries to preliminarily define the concept of legal power from both outside and inside aspects.

This thesis, however, insists that a complete understanding of the concept of legal power cannot be without the reference to the concept of power-conferring norm, even if a legal power does not necessarily come from a norm. In order to explain the nature of power-conferring norm, it first investigates the issue of what normative function means, and goes on to the study of the different theoretical understandings and evaluation of the nature and status of power-conferring norm. On the basis of the aforementioned investigation, this thesis claims that both in the perspective of its function or meaning, it seems power-conferring norm enjoys a independent status from duty-imposing norm, and cannot even more be reduced to permissive norm of the sense of tolerance. Contrarily, it suggests that it probable and desirable for us to find a proper place for power-conferring norm in the theory of legal system.

The main purpose of this thesis is to show: on the one hand, the nature of legal power is a kind of technique constructed by power-conferring norms to reduce the complexity of legal decision or the realization of law; on the other hand, the nature of power-conferring norm is, notwithstanding, irreducible to that of duty-imposing one, not to mention to that of permissive one of tolerance, and is susceptible of substantial values and interests. It seems, I think, to remind us that, considering concerns of the obligation to obey the law, power-conferring norm is not only independent of duty-imposing one as to its nature, but also seems to be prior to it in respect of its significance.

並列關鍵字

legal power ； legal competence ； norm ； power-conferring norm ； competence norm ； duty-imposing norm

參考文獻

Bobbio, Norberto

1998 “Kelsen and Legal Power,” in Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., Normativity and Norms. Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 435-449.

Bulygin, Eugenio

1992 “norms of competence,” Law and Philosophy 11(3): 201-216.

Delacroix, Sylvie