臺灣自1990年代規劃與研議國民年金,期間歷經內政部、立法委員、專家學者等的提案與討論,最後終於在2008年通過法案。南韓自1970年代的威權主義時期亦開始國民年金規劃,在快速通行之後,遲至1988年才正式施行。臺灣與南韓都在長時間的延宕後才正式施行國民年金,本文試圖從政治制度論的觀點,探究國民年金政策過程的理念與利益形態轉變,並找出究竟是「誰」左右了國民年金政策的樣貌。並藉由年金政策決議過程的「否決點」來透視政治制度的制約、行動者的理念導引、社會結構等三個層面,反省政治制度與行動者組合的變遷如何影響國民年金的發展方向。 本文發現臺灣國民年金在雙首長制、少數政府、民主轉化等制度制約之下,導致權責歸屬不清、行政權撕裂、政策不連續等特性,甚至形成政治空轉的民主困境,國民年金成為爭功諉過的政策承載點,影響制度建立應有的一致性。從民主突破到民主深化的過程中,國民年金體現臺灣政策決議過程的分散化特性。南韓的國民年金則在總統中心、維新體制、獨裁專制之下得以快速通行,但也因為過少的否決點造成國民年金的通行成為政治控制的手段之一,透過民主轉化的機制,增加否決點才得以使年金涵蓋範圍擴大成為可能。 在臺灣與南韓的國民年金政策歷程中,政治制度與民主轉型的影響,使臺灣朝向小整合分立式的政策,並成為老年經濟安全體系的福利缺口以及政治協商的產物。而南韓則在政治經濟強權引導之下,以軍公教為老年經濟安全優先保障對象,在民主突破後逐步實施擴大保障範圍。民主轉化的過程使否決點的數目增加,影響政策決策過程的角力,間接形塑國民年金可能的樣態。本文以研究社會政策過程中的否決點為基礎,進一步提供往後分析台灣社會福利政策及其意涵的不同反思取徑。
Taiwan began to discuss the establishment of national pension insurance in the 1990s, which was finally enacted in 2008 with the proposal by the Ministry of the Interior. Similarly, South Korea began the planning of national pension insurance during the period of authoritarianism in the 1970s, which came into force in 1988. Both Taiwan and South Korea had spent a long time of discussion before the national pension insurance was finally put into practice. This article seeks to explore the pension reforms in both countries from the perspective of political institutionalism in order to observe the change of ideas and interest formation during the policy process of national pension. Furthermore, this study aims to find out “who” has been influencing the policy processes of the national pension insurance, thereby identifying the “veto points” unfolded in the three aspects: the constraints of the political system, leading beliefs of the actors, and social structures. The effort is to study how the changes of political systems and actor constellations have impacted on the development for national pension. The main findings are that the interplay of the dual-leadership system, minority government, as well as democratic transformation, has led to unclear political accountability, dispersion of executive power, policy discontinuity, and political immobilism. As such, national pension has become the point of policy struggle for claiming credit and shifting blame, consequently undermining the system consistency. From the processes of democratic dilemma to its consolidation, national pension insurance has well demonstrated the irresolute feature of policymaking in Taiwan. As for the pension reform of South Korea, the policymaking process has quickly gone through the legislation under the presidential-centered dictatorial system; however, with insufficient veto points, it has rendered the legislation of the national pension insurance to become a measure of political control. Only after democratic transformation and the corresponding increase of veto points could the coverage of national pension insurance possibly expand. During the pension reforms in Taiwan and South Korean, the influence of political system and democratic transformation are leading Taiwan’s pension policy toward minor institutional integration, and it has become the product of welfare gap of old-age security. As for South Korea, under the guidance of powerful economic and political authority, it has sought at first to provide privileged economic security for the military personnel, civil servants, and teachers; then gradually broadened later its coverage after the democratic breakthrough. With the increase of veto points in the process of democratic transformation they have helped to influence the decision-making processes, indirectly shaping the outcomes of the national pension insurance. Based on the insights of the political institutionalism, this study of the policymaking process of pension policy offers a template for further analysis of diverse paths of social policy development in East Asia.