佛教對個人同一性與自我觀念之批判 ──以《雜阿含經》為主要依據──

Buddhist Critique of the Notions of Personal Identity and the Self ──According to the Saṃyuktāgama- Sūtra──

凃均翰(Chun-Han Tu)

指導教授 ： 蔡耀明

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.10449

摘要

本文主題為佛教對個人同一性與自我觀念之批判，乃以佛教非我說之義理解析為基礎，對西方哲學中的個人同一性與自我課題，進行哲學思辨與批判。
佛教依於其對經驗世界之觀察與理解，以緣起法則提出無常觀、空觀與中觀等正確認識世界的方式，也據此提出五蘊非我說，批判世人由主客二分思維所產生的主體性自我觀念。佛教一方面從形上學面向批判此主體性自我作為一種不可觀察的實體性存在，乃是一種存有學上的虛構；另一方面從認識論面向，批判主體性自我觀念無法說明認識過程的產生，也必須面對無從觀察其自身的理論困難。
個人同一性與自我觀念之間具有密切的論理關係。自我作為個人本質性的部分，也是個人經歷時空變化而保持同一性的基礎。本文分析個人與同一性之概念特性，說明個人同一性問題之癥結，在於同一性關係為一對一的確定關係。個人同一性與「個體」、「存在」等概念相互綑綁所形成的形上學論斷，無法切合於動態變化之生命實相，因此個人同一性只是一種虛假而空洞之議題。
個人同一性與主體性自我以往被視為行為責任歸屬之基礎。然而，佛教則依於緣起法則，以業報相續的觀念，取代個人同一性與主體性自我觀念，作為倫理學中行為責任歸屬的形上學解釋基礎。佛教的非我說與業報相續之觀念，兩者都是依循緣起法則，彼此融貫一致的說法。佛教據此解析生命相續變化之流程，從而面對生命的相關重要議題──輪迴與解脫，指引眾生邁向覺悟之道。

關鍵字

個人同一性 ； 自我 ； 緣起 ； 空 ； 中道 ； 業報

並列摘要

This thesis attempts a Buddhist critique of the notions of personal identity and the Self. Based on the Buddhist theory of anātman (non-self) , this research scrutinizes and criticizes key notions of personal identity and the Self in Western tradition of philosophy.
According to observation on and theorization of the empirical world, Buddhist scriptures propound the law of pratītya-samutpāda (dependent co-arising） in order to explicate their understanding of anitya (impermanence), śūnyatā (emptiness) and madhyamika (middle way). Through this process of speculation, Buddhist scriptures propose the anātman theory which further rebukes the notion of the subjectivity of the Self derived from the fallacious dichotomy of subject / object. From the stance of metaphysics, Buddhist scriptures contend that the subjectivity of the Self, as a non-observable substantial entity, is an ontological construction. Furthermore, from the epistemological position, Buddhist scriptures reveal the difficulty in explaining the cognitive process with the assumption of the subjectivity of the Self. Additionally, the assumption is supposed to face the theoretical difficulties derived from incapable of observing the Self.
Notions of personal identity and the Self are inextricably intertwined with each other. In terms of the Cartesian perspective, the Self, as the essential part of the person, is regarded as the foundation on which the person can maintain his/her sense of identity after experiencing temporal and spatial changes. However, I argue that the basic problem of personal identity is its one-one relationship, which lies in the hypothetical nexus among the conceptions of personal identity, individuality and existence. The underlying metaphysical assumption completely deviates from the dynamic flux of reality, so the issue of personal identity is in fact a deceptive and empty question.
Personal identity and the subjectivity of the Self are conventionally regarded by Western philosophy as responsible for individual behavior. In contrast, the Buddhist scriptures provide an alternative notion, namely the continuity of karma, to explicate the issue of individual responsibility. The Buddhist notions of anātman and karmic continuity are both based on the law of pratītya-samutpāda coherently. By means of these two notions, the Buddhists account for the mutable flux of life and solve the issues of saṃsāra and nirvāna, guiding the sentient beings to the ultimate enlightenment.

並列關鍵字

personal identity ； Self ； dependent co-arising ； emptiness ； middle way ； karma

參考文獻

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