針對雲端虛擬機器資源分配的多重資源阻斷攻擊

Migrant Attack: A Multi-Resource DoS Attack on Cloud Virtual Machine Migration Schemes

葉家榮(Jia-Rung Yeh)

指導教授 ： 逄愛君 ； 蕭旭君

國立臺灣大學/電機資訊學院/資訊工程學研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.01976

摘要

雲端是近年來資訊
產業發展的重心之一，他對資源擁有著非常彈性的使用能力，但同時也可能是可以被攻擊的特性。
我們提出一個新型的阻斷服務的攻擊模式-遷移式攻擊。此攻擊利用了兩點雲端的特性，一是不斷對其所擁有的實體機器為了能源或是效率上的考量做出的搬移，二是在同一台實體機器上虛擬機器之間的干擾。我們以多種資源的利用誘使雲端錯誤的對資源做出分配，並以搬移和不平衡的資源分配做為我們攻擊上的測量。同時我們也給出了可能可以防禦和偵測的討論。

關鍵字

阻斷攻擊 ； 雲端 ； 資源分配 ； 虛擬化 ； 虛擬機器

並列摘要

Live virtual machine (VM) migration is the core technology in elastic
cloud computing. With live VM migration, cloud providers can improve resource
use and quality of service by adjusting the VM placement on demand.
However, live migration is expensive because of high CPU usage and the
negative effect on co-located VMs, and frequent live migration thus severely
undermines the performance of the cloud. Although existing dynamic allocation
schemes are designed to minimize the number of live migrations, this
study demonstrated that a denial-of-service adversary can cause excessive live
migrations by exploiting dynamic allocation. The attack, which we term migrant
attack, deliberately varies the resource usages of a malicious VM to
trigger live migration. A crucial feature of the migrant attack is that even
if VMs on the same physical machine are perfectly isolated through virtualization,
a malicious VM can affect the availability of the co-located VMs.
As proof of concept, we investigated two common VM allocation schemes:
load balancing and consolidation. We evaluated the effectiveness of the attack
by using both simulations and testbed experiments. The evaluation results
demonstrated that the downtime with two malicious VMs can make more
than 250 s and nearly 50 s without any attack in three hours and the restriction
of migration times can effectively mitigate the frequenty migration directly.
We also discuss several potential countermeasures, such as enforcing another
layer of isolation between malicious and harmless VMs in dynamic allocation
schemes.

並列關鍵字

Denial of Service ； Cloud ； Resource allocation ； Virtualization ； Virtual machine

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