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  • 學位論文

從我國董事民事責任之現況論董事責任保險與公司補償制度

A Study of Directors' civil liability to Directors' liability and Corporate indemnification

指導教授 : 王文宇
共同指導教授 : 劉宗榮
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摘要


隨著2001年公司法第23條第1項忠實義務內涵充實、2002年證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法增訂、2003年投資人保護中心成立及民事訴訟法之團體訴訟制度建立、2006年證券交易法防弊改革、2009年投資人保護中心之股東代表訴權增訂、2010年內線交易濫訴改革等各項政策推行結果,我國董事因執行職務錯誤或違法濫權而遭到訴訟比例大幅增加不少,董事責任保險市場亦同此因素而蓬勃發展,由早期海外上市需求漸轉往國內董事賠償責任風險分散與訴訟、和解費用支出減輕方向發展,異於美國律師驅策制度(contingent fee)下董事責任保險制度發展方向。 其次,傳統上由股東提起訴訟抑制董事違法濫權及監督董事善盡受託義務之功效,實可改由專業保險人發揮公司治理外部監督機能,藉助董事責任保險契約經濟抑制機能防範董事疏於執行職務道德風險,杜絕董事受有超額填補給付空間,並減少紛擾不斷保險理賠糾紛。例如:藉由保險費率差異化與公司資訊強制揭露之效果,反應公司董事決策品質於每年保費調漲成本之中 ; 自負額與保險給付上限額之設計,避免過度理賠支出衝擊保險公司財務結構安全 ; 責任保險事故發生後,被保險人雙重通知義務之賦予,違反時所當承擔失權效果設計 ; 止爭息訟和解參與程序,保險人應有和解內容同意權與應負和解參與義務的平衡兼顧設計 ; 發揮責任保險權利保護功能與損失填補功能,由保險人預先支付必要且合理訴訟抗辯費用協助董事自身權益之捍衛並排除董事不必要訴訟困擾,落實公司以董事為被保險人投保董事責任保險之初衷等。 最後,為避免董事責任保險持續高理賠率及董事責任保險單一制度缺陷所帶來負面效應,似乎可以考慮引進同具董事賠償責任風險分散與損失填補的美國公司補償制度入我國,並參酌美國公司補償制度發展歷史、制度設計方式及兩國國情差異處予以適當引進。面對我國不具公司補償慣例卻已存在公司補償保險條款,則當繼續予以保留,提供給公司投保公司補償保險或由公司預先提撥一筆補償基金補償董事損失的選擇機會。

並列摘要


Resulted from enriching fiduciary duty in Article 23, Section 1 of the Company Act in 2001, enacting Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act in 2002, establishing the securities and futures investors protection center and the appearance of class action in Civil Procedural Law in 2003, reforming Securities and Exchange Act for prohibiting corruption in 2006, authorizing securities and futures investors protection center to take derivative suit in 2009, and reforming unnecessary suits in insider trading cases in 2010, directors being sued for taking their duties mistakenly or illegally increased a lot in our nation. Accordingly, the market of D&O insurance grew flourishingly, and transformed from listing abroad in early stage, to distributing the risk of compensation among domestic directors and decreasing payment to settlement , defence and litigation , which is different from the evoluion of directors insurance system under mechanism of contingent fee in America. Secondly, although it is the traditional thinking that shareholders play a role of filing a suit to prohibitg directors from taking duties illegally and supervising directors to correctly fulfill their duties, this function in reality could be replaced with professional insurers, since by economic deterrence of directors liability insurance, they could prevent directors’ moral hazard of taking duties negligently, put an end to directors obtaining excessive compensation, and reduce continuously occurring insurance diputes. For example, through differentiation of premium rate and mandatory disclosure, the quality of directors’ decision making could be reflected through the cost of increasing insurance premium every year; design of retention and limit of liability of insurance payment could avoid excessive expenditure of clams financially impacting on the safety of a insurance corporate; rendering the insured dual obligation to notify insurers after insured peril occurred, and abolishing the rights of those who did not fulfill their duties; in compromise and settlement procedure, insurer should simultaneously have rights to consent the content of compenstion and the obligation to participate for balancing the interests; the insurer paid necessary and reasonable defense cost for litigation in order to assist directors to protect their rights and exclude unnecessary suits, so as to meet the preliminary intention of the directors insurance proposed by the corporation. Finally, in order to prevent the high rate of claims on directors insurance and the negative effect caused by the deficiency of single type of directors insurance, bringing into the American corporate indemnification mechanism which has distribution of risk of directors liability and damages alike seems to deserve taking into consideration. Of course, as to transplantation, the history of American corporate indemnification mechanism, the method to establish such mechanism, and the difference between America and our nation should be cautiously taken into account. Besides, though there was no habit of corporate indemnification in our country, the existed corporate indemnification insurance clause should be maintained, so as to provide corporate the choice to propose corporate indemnification insurance, or to prepare indemnification fund for filling up the damages of directors in advance.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


謝丹瑜(2017)。獨立董事之職權、義務與責任〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU201700748
傅竑維(2016)。責任保險之被害人與被保險人保護-以直接訴權與參與權為核心〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU201602879

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