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  • 學位論文

臺灣金融產業的競爭政策—以競爭法的觀點出發

The Competition Policy on Taiwan Financial Industry: From the Perspective of Competition Law

指導教授 : 廖義男
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摘要


個別經濟體與社會對政府與市場以及其相對位置的想像、信念與價值判斷,相當大程度地決定了反托拉斯法的執法態度與傾向,以及應如何具體解釋充斥高度不確定法律概念的反托拉斯法條文。臺灣於1980與1990年代推動與制定競爭法制時,深受德國新自由主義以降的歐陸競爭法影響。惟不同於美國反托拉斯法以經濟效率優先但以消費者福利為標準、同受德國新自由主義影響的歐洲聯盟競爭法則是認為消費者利益為反射利益而在執行層面有多元目標的考量,臺灣負載政府管控的發展主義傳統,經濟政策素來強調追求規模經濟與經濟效率的重要性。本文以為,臺灣身為東北亞地區的相對小型經濟體,競爭政策的執行無法忽視廠商達成最低效率規模的重要性,不宜讓競爭政策同時肩負財富分散與保護中、小型企業的任務,故宜採取經濟效率優先及整體福利標準的競爭政策,但同時應特別避免因屈從追求或扶植國家龍頭企業的誘惑,而放鬆競爭法的執行,應僅在必要範圍內重視產業的規模經濟。另鑑於包括臺灣在內的東亞地區過往政府長期介入甚或扭曲市場的歷史,政府與管制仍然是主要的問題,與美國解除管制過度而於金融危機後以行為經濟學為基礎重回管制的情事顯有不同。且墊基於有利管制之行為經濟學的反托拉法政策理論,迄今尚未能就廠商或市場行為提出完整、一致性實證預測,其不論在理論基礎或是執法機關負荷能力上,都不是現階段的良好選擇。 金融危機的發生,再度觸及關於競爭政策與產業政策的爭論核心。臺灣金融業歷來一直受到高度管制,從2001年金融改革以來,臺灣政府也明確支持整併金融業,在金融產業形成國內龍頭產業。臺灣金融產業是目前最能體現管制與競爭法規互動、消長與相互競爭關係、政府在市場經濟扮演的角色,以及臺灣競爭政策取向與發展的領域。本文彙整公平交易委員會(以下簡稱為「公平會」)歷年來關於金融機構的執行案例與金融業的管制法規結構,就公平會未來在金融產業執行競爭法,提出下列建議: 1. 公平會歷年來在金融機構結合案件的審理上,過度向產業政策傾斜,未來應以經濟效率優先,加強分析、研究金融機構規模經濟與範疇經濟可能產生的經濟效率,並據此判斷參與結合事業關於整體經濟利益的主張是否實在,包括適度依據公平交易法(以下簡稱為「公平法」)第12條第2項,為附加條件或負擔等附款,以確保整體經濟利益大於限制競爭之不利益。就結合違法性審核標準而論,宜採顯著阻礙競爭而非形成或強化市場支配地位為審查標準。 2. 金融機構太大不能倒並非公平交易法現在與未來要關注的焦點,應劃歸金融管制法規。另宜刪除我國金融法規明文豁免公平法結合申報等規定,若認為仍有必要因應金融穩定性為例外性處理,亦宜在法規設計上明確界定相關適用要件,並以縮短結合申報後的等待期間等方式為之,甚至亦可仿照美國所謂的口袋裁決(”pocket decree”)制度,解決短期金融穩定與長期市場競爭議題間的衝突。 3. 公平會應採實質影響標準加強釐清結合的認定。公平會在處理金融機構結合案件時,應參考與援用金融產業法規諸如金融控股公司法中關於控制性持股與關係人等規定,可讓適用公平法第6條第1項第5款時,能更有具體依據。此外,若一事業直接或間接掌控他事業董監事或經理人,就股份有限公司而言,除章程另有更高的規定外,應認為至少在一事業若擔任、取得或控制他事業的董事長、總經理,或超過三分之一以上的董事席次而足以否決應經董事會特別決議的重要事項,此時即應認為該事業對他事業具有實質影響,而有可能構成結合;如取得他事業常務董事一定席位而得以在公司日常事務經營扮演一定角色者,則必須再密切注意兩者有無其他兩者顯然處於同一管領力下的事實或影響競爭因素而得綜合判斷有構成結合的可能。以此一標準觀之,未來公平會若未能加強或注意政府在金融機構的實質影響力,以及金融業間透過多層次公司架構或家族集團設立多個投資公司以掌控多家金融產業等情事或可能,將可能低估臺灣金融業的實際市場集中度。 4. 依現行法規,金融控股公司與非金融事業仍有透過董事兼充、董事席位掌握(包括透過同一集團或家族所捐助財團法人等達成控股架構等及運用公司法第27條)等方式形成結合關係的可能。在台灣,一般產業集團與金融機構或金融控股公司實質結合的情形,並不罕見。未來金融市場逐步集中時,應特別注意當部分企業集團集中掌控金融業以後,可能藉由讓其所屬金融機構拒絕提供資本或服務予其集團下其他產業的競爭者,以獲取該集團在其他產業的競爭優勢,從事無關規模經濟效率的排他性行為。且因多角化結合在臺灣仍有其特殊風險存在,公平法第11條第1項第1款、第2款對掌握大型企業跨入新市場或跨市場的影響力,仍有重要意義。 5. 若未來在金融業的結合管制上採取比較寬鬆的政策,則除應加強不符合公平法第14條第1項但書之聯合行為的執法,另應嚴厲取締對效率無助益的具市場力量事業之排他行為或人為進入障礙。公平會應於管制法規有缺漏或於管制放鬆時積極介入促進市場競爭,並加強對金融業的瞭解(例如保險業的共保聯營行為)避免自行放棄執法。針對臺灣各類金融業基礎交易、結算與資訊處理平台等獨占事業以管制法規為主的法令結構,不宜援用美國Trinko 與Credit Suisse兩案的論理將仍以管制法規為重的金融領域(例如證券市場)之市場競爭行為均歸諸金融主管機關規制,諸如證券承銷過程中可能出現的限制競爭行為,仍有公平會適用公平法介入的空間與可能。 6. 公平會應妥善運用公平法第9條第2項規定,就金融機構的股權結構、轉投資行為以及金融市場法規與實務狀況等事項,定期與金融主管機關金融監督管理委員會(以下簡稱為「金管會」)進行溝通;於金融消費者保護法通過後,金管會制定子法及爭議處理機構於擬定或主管機關於審核爭議處理原則時,得仿照陶德-法蘭克法案的設計精神,妥善運用公平法第9條第2項規定,徵詢公平會的意見,將公平會已積累的案例類型予以納入。按公平法第24條並不適合充作保護金融商品消費者的主要依據,以相對市場優勢地位理論介入金融機構的搭售行為亦有不當,未來公平會在金融消費者保護事項,宜退居第二線,使公平會能將資源從此部分釋放出來,轉向本文所建議之反托拉斯法層面的加強管制。

並列摘要


Individual economies may adopt different ideologies concerning the interrelation between government and market, and their approach thereof will largely determine theirattitudes and tendencies in antitrust law enforcement, and how to interpret the highly uncertain legal concepts and terms in antitrust law. Upon advocating and establishing competition law in 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan was deeply influenced by European competition law, which follows German Ordo-liberalism tradition. Compared to American antitrust law emphasizing efficiency with consumer welfare standard and European Union competition law simultaneously pursuing multiple goals, Taiwan has been embedded the developmentalism tradition. Taiwan economic policies consistently recognize the importance of efficiency and economies of scale. Therefore, as a relatively small economy in North East Asia, the enforcement of Taiwan antitrust law could not ignore the merits of firms’ attaining minimum efficient scale (MES), and it is appropriate for Taiwan to adopt the competition policy highlighting efficiency and using total welfare criterion. Nevertheless, Taiwan should be wary of the temptation of pursuing or supporting national champions, and then loosening antitrust law enforcement. The emphasis placed on economies of scale should be limited to necessary extent. In addition, in Taiwan, the lasting governmental intervention and regulations related to the market economy are still the main issues, which is different from the background of strong advocates of re-regulation based upon the behavioral economies in the United States after the financial crisis. Moreover, since behavioral antitrust policy has not presented a comprehensive and coherent set of theories and empirical evidence to predict market activities, it is not a good choice for Taiwan antitrust enforcement now. The recent financial crisis triggered the debate about and tension between competition policy and industry policy. Taiwan financial industry is highly regulated, and Taiwan government explicitly supports the mergers among financial institutions in order to foster national champion. Hence, financial industry is the specific field embodying the interrelation, competition and conflict between competition law and regulations, the role of Taiwan government in Taiwan economy, and the approach and development of Taiwan competition policy. The author of this thesis compiled and analyzed the cases regarding financial institutions investigated by Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (“Taiwan FTC”) and Taiwan financial regulations. Based upon the foregoing, the author makes the suggestions as to the future enforcement of the Fair Trade Act (“FTA”) in financial industry as follows: 1. Taiwan FTC has submitted to industrial policy when reviewing the merger cases of financial institutions for many years. Taiwan FTC shall strengthen its economic analysis of and research onefficiency arising from economies of scale and scope possibly achieving by the mergers of financial institutions, and then,under Article 12 of the FTA,determine whether the overall economic benefit outweighs the disadvantages resulted from competition restraints, and it is necessary or appropriate to attach conditions or require undertakings to conduct specific acts. In addition, Taiwan FTC shall adopt the criterion of significantly impeding competition rather than forming or strengthening market dominating position in reviewing the legality of the merger case in dispute. 2. “Too big to fail” financial institutions should not be the main concern of the FTA and shall be coped with in financial regulations. The exemptions now described in Taiwan financial regulations from merger fillings should be deleted. Any exemption due to financial stabilization concerns should be clearly defined with shortening the waiting period after merger filings. Furthermore, following pocket decree procedure in the United States to balance short-term financial stabilization with long-term market competition may be a better choice compared to completely exemption. 3. Taiwan FTC should embrace material influence standard to resolve if there is any situation qualifying as the “merger” described in Article 6 of the FTA, and refer to “controlling interest” and “same concerned person ” defined in Article 4 of the Financial Holding Company Act upon the application of Article 6 I(5) of the FTA. Furthermore, in the event that one enterprise directly or indirectly control directors, supervisors, or high-rank officers of the other enterprise to the extent that the former enterprise could serve as or control the chairman of board of directors, chief executive officers, or be able to veto the matters required to be approved by the supermajority resolution of the boards of the latter enterprise, the former enterprise should be deemed to have a material influence on the latter enterprise, which is possible to establish the merger defined in Article 6 of the FTA; if the former enterprise could serve as or control the managing directors of the latter enterprise, Taiwan FTC shall thoroughly examineany other facts that these two enterprises are under the same control, or other factors that will influence market competition, in order to determine whether there is a merger under Article 6 of the FTA. 4. From this perspective, if Taiwan FTC is unable to notice the material influence of Taiwan government on several big financial conglomerates, and the plans or schemes that financial institutions or family groups use multi-tiers corporation structures, or investment corporations to control several financial institutions, Taiwan FTC may improperly underestimate the concentration rate of Taiwan financial market. 5. Financial holding companies could virtually merger with nonfinancial enterprises under Article 6 of the FTA through interlocking directorates or directly or indirectly controlling the directors of the other enterprises (especially by means of Article 27 of the Company Act or endowing foundations). It is common in Taiwan that family groups simultaneously control industrial groups and financial conglomerates, or industrial groups control financial institutions. Faced with Taiwan the potential financial merger wave in the following years, Taiwan FTC should be mindful of the risk that some industrial conglomerates controlling large or various financial institutions will pursue the competitive advantages,or engage in anti-competitive activities without any efficiency related to economies of scaleby directing the affiliated or controlled financial institutions not to give capital to the competitors of these industrial conglomerates or its subsidiaries or affiliates. Moreover, since conglomerate mergers may pose some competitive concerns in Taiwan, the market share thresholds described in Article 11 Ⅰ(1) and (2) are still meaningful for controlling the larger conglomerates’ influence straddling different markets. 6. If Taiwan FTC takes more lenient view on the mergers of financial institutions, Taiwan FTC shall strictly prohibit illegal cartels andinvestigate the exclusionary actions of the enterprises with market power and any barrier caused by these enterprises. In addition, Taiwan FTC shall vigorously enforce the FTA to stimulate market competition when the financial regulations are relaxed or there is any loophole therein, and look into the complicated financial activities, e.g. co(re)-insurance, more carefully so that Taiwan FTC will not take these activities for granted and be sluggish in enforcing the FTA with regard thereto.Financial regulations are more dominant in financial exchange, clearing, and information platform that are monopolies. However, it would be unwise to refer to Trinko and Credit Suisse cases in the United States and let the financial authority be completely in charge of market competition in some strongly regulated financial fields. For instance, there shall be still room for Taiwan FTC’s intervention ofapplying the FTA to anticompetitive activities related to securities underwriting. 7. Taiwan FTA and Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”) should establish a communication mechanism under Article II of the FTA on shareholding structure, investment, market dynamic related to financial institutions. In addition, after Financial Consumer Protection Act takes in force, FSC shall incorporate the rules developed from the cases invested by Taiwan FTC and targeting financial institution for protecting financial consumers under Article 9 II of the FTA. However, as for financial consumer protection, Taiwan FTC shall step back to the second line. Neither is appropriate to use Article 24 of the FTA as the main remedy to protect financial consumers, nor is proper to apply market relatively superior position theory to deal with tying in financial products. Then Taiwan FTC shall set its resources aside for strengthening antitrust law enforcement.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


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呂倩茹(2014)。限制台灣企業對陸投資規範之探討 -商業因應策略與法律執行效果之審視〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840%2fcycu201400009
黃文甄(2010)。我國事業結合申報制度之研究〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840%2fcycu201000965
蔡鈞柔(2007)。技術移轉合資行為之研究-以我國與歐盟競爭法為中心-〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840%2fCYCU.2007.00654
呂儒亞(2017)。跨國併購的行政管制—以市場競爭及國家安全為核心〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU201703684

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