台灣上市櫃金融機構董監事改選對股東財富影響之研究

The Impacts of Re-election of Board on Shareholder’s Wealth : The Case of TSE & OTC of Financial Institutions

林兆文(Zhao-Wen Lin)

指導教授 ： 謝德宗

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.02334

摘要

本研究主要是探討台灣上市櫃金融機構董監事改選對股東財富的影響。利用事件研究法，分析股價的變動。並且依照競爭程度及改選結果之不同進行實證研究，俾對董監事改選抗爭事件之訊息效果做更精確之測試。除了2005~2007年之群組外，另外加入對照組2008~2012年研究樣本，以探討金管會於2008年針對金融機構修正的委託書規則所造成的影響。

經由實證顯示:
(1)2005~2007年之股價實證結果支持董監事改選會對股東財富產生負面影響，且股價負報酬與競爭程度強弱及反對派獲得席次多寡呈正向關係。
(2)2008~2012年的樣本則是發現董監事改選事件對股東財富產生正面影響，但並不顯著，而競爭程度強弱及反對派獲得席次多寡還是與股價負報酬呈正向關係。

關鍵字

董監事改選 ； 事件研究法 ； 股東財富 ； 委託書規則 ； GARCH

並列摘要

The main purpose of this research is to investigate the impacts of re-election of board on shareholder’s wealth. By using event study methodology to analyze share price for the sample companies selected from 2005~2007, this empirical research clarifies the informational effect of such contest from different dimensions, such as level of competition and the re-election results. Given that Financial Supervisory Commission R.O.C amended the regulations of Rules Governing the Use of Proxies for Attendance at Shareholder Meetings of Public Companies in 2008, this study also applies the control group selected starting from 2008 to 2012 to study the impact of the amendment.

The empirical results show:
(1)In 2005 to 2007, the incidence of the contest of re-election of board is negatively related to shareholder’s wealth, and the negative return on share prices are positively related to contest intensity and the number of director sears seized by the dissident.
(2)In 2008 to 2012, the incidence of the contest of re-election of board is positively related to shareholder’s wealth, but not significant effect. Contest intensity and the number of director sears seized by the dissident are still positively related to the negative return on share prices.

Keywords: Re-election of board, Event study, Shareholder’s wealth, Rules Governing the Use of Proxies for Attendance at Shareholder Meetings of Public Companies, GARCH

並列關鍵字

Re-election of board ； Event study ； Shareholder’s wealth ； Rules Governing the Use of Proxies for Attendance at Shareholder Meetings of Public Companies ； GARCH

參考文獻

13. 洪聰敏，委託書徵求與董監改選對會計資訊與公司價值影響之研究，中原大學會計研究所，民國92年。

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