中國大陸農村生活垃圾治理研究——四川省丹棱縣龍鵠模式的初探

經濟發展與現代化雖然帶來便利的生活，但也造成環境的污染，在中國大陸農村中垃圾問題逐漸變得嚴重且難以解決，「垃圾圍村」的現象充斥於各地，成為政府亟欲改善的治理問題。四川省丹棱縣龍鵠村的生活垃圾治理模式在財政資源與技術缺乏的情況下，改變村民的環境意識，主動參與分類和監督，再加上公開競標垃圾承包人的機制，以低成本的代價達到優秀的治理成效。本文即在探討該模式獲得成功的因素，並試圖在理論的基礎上提出解釋這個模式成功的因果關係假說，以供其他經驗性研究進行後續更深入的驗證與探究。本文以集體行動理論、非正式制度理論、公共服務委外與代理人理論以及協力治理的理論框架來梳理該模式中自變項與依變項間的因果關係，並透過田野調查的研究方法實際到四川省丹棱縣龍鵠村對官員與村民等12位受訪者進行半結構式的深度訪談，訪談所獲得的實證資料用以提供和支持本文所提出的假說。研究結果歸結出丹棱縣龍鵠模式成功的五個假說，其中政治企業家、基於社會網絡的非正式制度、選擇性誘因機制三個因素有利於集體行動的發生；社會網絡提供的資訊量多寡和社會網絡的問責效果則有利於克服委託－代理關係所產生的逆向選擇與道德風險問題。

關鍵字

農村垃圾治理；集體行動；非正式制度；代理人理論；田野調查

並列摘要

The waste pollution has increased with modernization and development in rural China, where there was no proper system of garbage management. The Chinese government had been attempting to solve this problem and developed some successful model to cope with garbage problem in rural China. One of them is the model of Longcun Village in Sichuan Province, which managed the domestic waste with limited financial and technical resources by improving villagers’ environmental awareness to initiatively participate in garbage classification and supervision. In addition, the village contracted out the collection and transportation services to private villagers through specific open bidding institution. This thesis tries to explain why the model of Longcun Village is successful and state several hypotheses based on related theories. The thesis adopts collective action theory, informal institution theory, public service contract-out and principal-agent theory, and collaborative governance theory to analyze the relations between independent variables and dependent variables in the model. I conducted a field study by interviewing 12 officials and villagers in Danleng County and Longcun Village with semi-structured in-depth interview method. Our research demonstrates five hypotheses for the model’s success, which include: Political entrepreneurship, informal institutions based on social network, and selective incentives may cause the collective action; the amount of information with social network and accountability with social network can resolve the principal-agent problem of adverse selection and moral hazard.