零售商或平台商？線上中介商的商業模式選擇

Merchant or Platform? The Business Model Selection Problem of an Online Intermediary

陳韋志(Wei-Chih Chen)

指導教授 ： 孔令傑

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/資訊管理學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201704144

摘要

時至今日，線上中介商在電子商務中扮演了重要角色。傳統上它以零售商的方式向製造商購買商品再販售給消費者；隨著科技的演進，越來越多的中介商選擇轉型成為平台，將消費者轉介給賣家。由於可能的商業模型不只一種，對中介商而言，如何抉擇一個恰當的商業模型無可厚非地是個必須考慮的議題。
為了探討這個問題，我們建立了一個賽局模型，考慮一個線上中介商與數個製造商，其中製造商們生產異質性的商品並相互競爭。中介商有的選項為：（1）以零售商自居，向製造商買進商品。（2）以平台身分讓製造商直接販售商品給終端消費者。兩種商業模型間最關鍵的差異點為零售模式具有設定零售價的權力，但是平台沒有。
我們的研究結果指出隨著商品在生產端或消費者端的異質程度減少，中介商在零售模式與平台模式的抉擇中會比較偏向平台模式。相對地，如果商品們差異甚大，零售模式會是一個較好的選項。除此之外，我們進一步考慮了混合模式，即讓部分製造商以零售模式合作，部分製造商以平台模式合作。結果指出，中介商應與生產成本較低的製造商以平台模式合作，因為先行者優勢應利用在更具商業潛力的商品。另一方面，我們也研究了以收入分成方式合作的平台模式，發現隨著商品相似度提高，其抑制高零售價抑制的特性會侵蝕中介商的利潤。

關鍵字

線上中介商 ； 雙層供應鏈 ； 雙邊平台 ； 賽局理論

並列摘要

Online intermediary plays an important role in e-commerce nowadays. Traditionally, it serves as a merchant buying goods from manufacturers and reselling them to consumer. With the development of technology, more and more intermediaries choose to become platforms referring consumers to sellers. As there are more than one potential business models exist, it is critical for an intermediary to decide which model to adopt.
To address this question, we establish a game-theoretic model with an intermediary and multiple manufacturers competing in selling heterogeneous products. The intermediary has the options of (1) playing the role of a merchant and buying goods from the manufacturers and (2) being a platform and allowing manufacturers to reach end consumers through it. The key difference between the two models is a merchant has the power to set the retail price, while a platform does not.
Our analysis indicates that as the heterogeneity among products decreases, either at the production or the consumer side, the intermediary prefers the platform model to the merchant model. Nevertheless, if the products are highly distinct, the merchant model will be a better choice. Moreover, we further study the mixed model that combines both the merchant and platform models. Considering the first-mover advantage, the intermediary should adopt the platform model for the cost-effective manufacturer as his product owns greater commercial potential. On the other hand, we investigate the implementation of the platform model with revenue sharing. Restriction of high price hurts the intermediary's profit when the product similarity goes up.

並列關鍵字

Online intermediary ； Two-layer supply chain ； Two-sided platform ； Game theory

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