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  • 學位論文

台北對「兩國論」、「一邊ㄧ國論」危機處理之比較

Taipei Crisis Management on "Special State-to-state Relationship" and "One Country on Each Side":A Comparative Study

指導教授 : 林中斌

摘要


台北分別於一九九九年七月九日提出「兩國論」;二○○二年八月三日提出「一邊一國論」後,引起台灣對「美」、「中」關係危機,台北如何處理?兩次台北處理方式有何異、同?我們是否可以較深入探討中華民國—台灣,在國際上爭取主權獨立之國家定位上,面臨如何的環境?歷此二次經驗,我們是否可尋獲更適切的途徑,來確保人民的安全福祉及國家的永續久安? 本文分七章論述。章節安排,有其邏輯流程。第一章:討論本文的動機目的、文獻探討、研究方法、章節流程及研究限制。第二章:首先,論述「兩國論」提出及其背景:從李前總統謀劃「強化台灣主權」,看台灣的主權環境;透過組織規劃、研究,李前總統個人認為時機成熟時,如何將憲法學者的「特殊國與國的關係」,宣示為富有政治意涵的「兩國論」。第三章:其次,觀察台北如何因應美、中反應。即北京的文攻武赫,加上華府的壓力下,台北如何危機處理?尤其,台北一路修正,最後回到原點的過程,探究如何與北京、華府因果互動。第四章:再次,論述「一邊一國論」提出及其背景:陳水扁總統就任前相關談話,並就職後對大陸曾有的善意,及北京的態度。在未獲北京正面、積極回應下,轉折性的如何提出「一邊一國論」,並探究其意涵。第五章:然後,觀察台北如何因應美、中反應。即台北的主動說明與積極赴美,華府的壓力,及北京的文攻策略。就此,本文特就與「兩國論」不同的危機處理,加以整理,做為後面章節比較的根據。第六章:結論之前,先比較兩次危機處理之異同及其原因。又在相同與相異間,本文也做出輕重之比較,及台灣處境的趨勢。 第七章,以四個方面做出結論如下: 第一、「兩國論」:透過以上觀察,呈現出「特殊的國與國關係」原創意涵,似為憲法學者的學術觀點,轉變成政治意味濃厚的「兩國論」;危機爆發原因則可能是結合李前總統提出「兩國論」、七月十日辜振甫先生的談話、七月十二日報紙報導政府即將修憲、修法,及當天下午陸委會主委蘇起記者會中,宣稱打破「一個中國」的迷思,被解讀為台北已拋棄「一個中國」等三項因素。 第二、「一邊一國論」:最有可能的其情形是,陳總統提出「一邊一國論」固然不令人意外,但北京打擊台北的善意,則加深了兩岸鴻溝。 第三、兩次危機處理的比較:觀察到,台北主觀上縱有調整與相當程度的改進,仍有諸多相同的國內外客觀環境限制,及不當的個人化決策慣性。 第四、台灣主權環境:現實上擁有獨立主權,實際上則受到強大的壓抑,兩件事實的交錯,形塑了台灣的主權環境。突破的方式,除了強化人民的主權認同外,爭取美方強而有力的支持,或許是關鍵所在。 最後,以有限的資料,本文發現有待釐清爭點存在。茲整理筆者認為重要者,計有三項。

並列摘要


Taipei announced on two occasions the “Special State-to-State Relationship” and the “One Country on Each Side” on July 9, 1999 and August 3, 2002 respectively, which triggered the crises in the Taiwan-US(or Taiwan-China) relations. How did Taipei handle these situations? What are the similarities and differences between these two crisis managements? Is it possible to discuss more thoroughly the environment facing ROC (Taiwan), which tries to strive for its independent and sovereign status? After these two experiences, can we find a more appropriate approach to ensuring the security and benefits for all Taiwanese people and the sustainable peace of Taiwan? There are seven chapters in this thesis and each chapter and section is logically arranged. In Chapter 1, I will discuss the motive and objective of this thesis, search and review of bibliographic materials, research method and approach, arrangement of chapters and sections, and the restrictions of this research. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the announcement of the “Special State-to-State Relationship” and its background. Under what kind of sovereign environment of Taiwan did former President Lee Teng-hui cogitate to “solidify Taiwanese sovereignty”? Through organizational formulating and research, former President Lee personally thought about how, when the time was right, he would interpret the “Special State-to-State Relationship”, which was proposed by some constitutional scholars, with more political implications (the so-called “Two-States Theory”). In Chapter 3, we will look at how Taipei reacted to the responses from the US and China? I analyzed Taipei’s crisis management under the verbal intimidation and saber rattling demonstrated by Beijing and the pressure from the US. Particularly, Taipei adjusted its declaration along the way, only to revert to the starting point in the end. We will examine the mutual effects between Taipei, the US and China in the process. In Chapter 4, I will discuss the announcement of the “One Country on Each Side” theory and its background: President Chen Shui-bian’s speeches before his inauguration, his goodwill toward China after he was sworn in, and the attitude of Beijing. we will examine how did President Chen announced the “One Country on Each Side” theory after feeling frustrated not getting direct and positive response from Beijing, and what this step signifies. In Chapter 5, I will discuss how Taipei dealt with the reactions from the US and China. We will observe how Taipei launched into explaining itself and actively went to the US to defend its declaration, while facing pressure from the US and suffering from Beijing’s verbal intimidation strategy. According to this, I have digested the differences of the crisis management between these two crises and made a comparison in the following chapters. In Chapter 6, before the conclusion, I will compare the differences and similarities of, as well as the reasons for these two crisis managements. And from the differences and similarities, a comparison is made to analyze the trend of Taiwan’s changing environment. In Chapter 7, it comes to the conclusion of this thesis, which will include four aspects: First, the “Special State-to-State Relationship” aspect: through the above-mentioned observation, it seems that the original meaning of the “Special State-to-State Relationship” came from some constitutional scholars, which was later interpreted with more political meanings (that is, the so-called “Two-States Theory”). There are three factors resulting in this crisis. One is that former President Lee announced the “Special State-to-State Relationship”. Another is Mr. Koo Chen-fu’s remarks on this issue on July 10. The other one is that on July 12, 1999 the press reported that the Taiwanese government was going to revise the constitution and some laws, and in that day afternoon Su Chi, chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, asserted in a press conference that the government would break the “one China” myth, a step later interpreted as Taiwan’s abandonment of “one China”. Second, the “One Country on Each Side” aspect: the most possible scenario is for President Chen to announce the “One Country on Each Side” theory, which would not be a surprise. However, Beijing’s move to play down Taipei’s goodwill is widening the gap in the Cross-Strait relations. Third, the comparison between these two crises: we can see that, although Taipei in some extent adjusted and improved their actions and policy, there were obviously still many similar domestic and foreign restrictions and constraints, and tendency toward inappropriate self-centered decision-making. Fourth, the sovereign environment of Taiwan: Taiwan is a de facto independent and sovereign country, while also practically under grave oppression; the two factors combined to shape the sovereign environment of Taiwan. To make a breakthrough will mean to rely on solidifying the sovereign identity of the Taiwanese people and, maybe even more crucially, obtaining strong support from the US. Finally, we will look at how, due to the constraints of limited information and materials, there still remain some controversial points, among which are three points I believe are important.

參考文獻


周繼祥,〈〈一個中國的原則與臺灣問題〉白皮書發表後的兩岸關係發展〉,《立法院院聞》,28卷4期,2000年4月。
林中斌,〈Tactical Adjustment and Strategic Persistence(北京對台政策戰術靈活和 戰略堅持)〉,《國家發展研究》第二卷第一期,台灣大學國家發展研究所,2002年12月。
Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution,2005).
參考文獻:
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