本研究係探討公司投資架構之投資層級多寡與投資效率之關聯性。當投資層級愈多時,資訊移轉及收集的過程會愈為複雜,使得母公司傳達給外部人之資訊中,底層公司之資訊模糊不明,勢必導致外部資金提供者提高外部資金成本;此外,投資層級愈多亦使管理階層傾向於過度投資在底層公司並移轉底層公司之資源以使自己獲利,而讓外部股東之利益受到損害。因此,換言之,投資層級愈多將會導致公司與投資大眾間産生資訊不對稱及代理問題。公司與投資人間所產生的資訊不對稱會導致公司外部資金成本增加,使得公司有獲利可能性的計畫無法被執行,因而造成投資不足,亦使公司傾向使用內部資金進行投資,故資本支出對現金流量的變動是呈現正向反應;管理階層與外部股東所產生的代理問題,是由於管理階層為追求自己的利益而將公司之自由現金流量投資在擴大公司規模而非有獲利可能之計畫上,因此,管理階層手中握有自由現金流量時,會傾向於過度投資,使得公司資本投資計畫對於現金流量之變動呈現正向的反應。實證結果發現投資層級之數量與公司現金流量敏感度呈現正向關係,故投資層級數量與公司資本支出之投資效率呈現負向關係。
In this study, I would like to examine how investment layers relate to firm-level capital investment efficiency. I first argue that investment layers will reduce investment efficiency because the complex process of transferring information from the lowest-tier firms to the parent company on the apex of investment structure can increase information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders. Besides, as controlling shareholders usually expropriate resources through the pyramid investment structure, I argue that the agency problems between management and outside capital providers can increase as the number of layers increases. Using the negative sensitivity of investment to cash flow as a proxy for investment efficiency, I find that the number of investment layers in firms’ investment structure is negatively related to investment efficiency.