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  • 學位論文

論金融監督管理委員會之組織法制

A Study on Organizational Law of Financial Supervision Commission and its Related Regulations

指導教授 : 陳志龍
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摘要


金融之功能在於將資金剩餘者之閒置資金轉由資金需求者運用,因而能發揮改善資源配置效率之效果,則金融體制之健全即深切地影響國家整體之經濟發展,故追求「金融穩定」已成為工商國家施政主要目標之一,而金融監理之最主要目的即為維護金融穩定,且於現代金融體系中,以國家公權力介入私經濟行為之金融監理制度,已屬維護金融穩定所不可或缺之機制之一。 金融監理組織法制部分所牽涉之議題包含組織法、行為法、作用法等層面,其中組織法為金融監理機關之建立依據,涉及獨立性、監理組織建置模式(分工監理或一元監理)、內部組織結構等,至於行為法與作用法則涉及監理機關之權限範圍,以及如何界分金融監理機關與其他機關之權責等問題。金融監理可分為金融管理與金融監督兩個不同之部分,前者屬於「總體面」之管制,而後者則為「個體面」之控制措施,然「防弊」重於「興利」皆係監理者行使管理與監督事務所應秉持之原則,且管理事務與監督事務皆有獨立化之需求,然若立法不接受管理獨立之概念,則宜考慮採行純粹監督機關之建制,另必須強調的是,獨立化與制衡機制相互間實為相輔相成而非互斥關係。 金管會之設立除係基於金融監理一元化外,同時亦有意藉此使監理機關獨立化,然而立法上之獨立保障規範與制衡規範皆欠缺明確性,導致金管會似乎僅係空有獨立機關之頭銜,而金管會內部組織結構方面,除存在獨任制與合議制之爭議外,採行機構監理模式是否適當亦存有不同之看法,又權責明確程度對監理機關之獨立性與監理目的之完成度息息相關,而此主要涉及與其他機關之權責界分以及行政委託之問題,監理一元化後固然已消除不少權限重疊之現象,然目前金管會與部分機關間之權責仍有待釐清,整體而言,金管會組織法制上之缺失似乎與法律明確性不足脫不了關係。

並列摘要


The major function of banking and capital markets is enabling those who use the idle capital in the market, thus enhancing the efficiency of the allocation of resources. Thereof, a state’s overall economic development is highly affected by stability of banking and capital markets. To built-up a stable banking and capital markets becomes one of the foremost goals for developing and developed countries to pursue. The primary aim of financial supervision is to maintain financial stability. States through application of authorities to intervene the private economic transactions in the current banking and capital markets becomes an indispensable mechanism to maintain financial stability. The issues are related to the regulations of financial supervision institutions, which covering the aspects of organization laws, proceeding laws, and executive laws. Amongst those, organization laws are the constituent instruments of financial supervisory agencies and pertain to such issues as independency, the models of supervisory organization (distributed supervision or unitary supervision), and the internal organizational structures. Proceeding laws and executive laws demarcate the power and the responsibilities of supervisory agencies. Financial supervision can be divided into two fields, the first of which is financial management that involves “macroscopic” measures, and the second is financial supervision in its narrow sense that involves “microscopic” measures. However, the major principle of two fields: “flaw prevention” shall always precede “profit boost”. Additionally, both financial management and financial supervision require being independency. However, if the legislature cannot accept the concept of independent management, then have to consider setting up an institution of a pure supervisory agency. In the mean time, it shall be elucidated that independency and check-and-balance are actually complementary rather than contradictory. To vest supervisory agencies with independency is one of the purposes of establishing the Financial Supervisory Committee while the unitization of financial supervision is another. Nevertheless, the prescriptions of independency and check-and-balance are ambiguous in the current legislation. The Financial Supervisory Committee is thus merely purported to be an independent agency. As to the internal organizational structure of the Financial Supervisory Committee, the existing disputes concerning single or collective leadership and debates of whether adopt institutional supervision or not. The determinacy of power and responsibilities closely relates to the independency of the supervisory agency and the success of supervision. This pertains to the division of power and responsibilities between the financial supervisory agency and other agencies as well as issues of entrusting administrative authority to private agencies. Although the unitization of supervision has indeed eliminated many problems resulted from overlap of authority, the power and responsibilities of the Financial Supervisory Committee and a few other agencies still demand exposition. By and large, the drawback of the law of the organization of the Financial Supervisory Committee nests in the law’s ambiguity.

參考文獻


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