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  • 學位論文

意識、觀視與德行-梅朵論道德能動性

Consciousness, Vision, and Virtue: Iris Murdoch on Moral Agency

指導教授 : 陳文團

摘要


本論文以當代英國哲學家兼小說家艾瑞斯・梅朵(Iris Murdoch, 1919-1999)之道德哲學為研究主題,試圖藉由「意識」(consciousness)、「觀視」(vision)與「德行」(virtue)三大概念及層次重構其道德模型,據以回應發展自康德理性啟蒙傳統下的現代道德哲學,為道德能動性提出更充分的說明。 根據梅朵的看法,以「沙特式存在主義」(Sartrean existentialism)與「英美語言行為主義」(Anglo-Saxon linguistic behaviourism)為代表的現代道德哲學將道德行動者化約為孤立的自律理性意志,並將道德能動性的核心放在意志的自由選擇與行動,既忽略對行動者內在生命歷程的觀照,未能為人類豐富多元的道德經驗與現象提供充分的概念與修辭,亦無法適當地解釋道德變化的本質,為人類提出一套有效的成德指引,是不夠周全的道德理論。為了拓寬與深化對人類道德生命之理解,梅朵道德哲學的重心在於恢復道德自我與價值、歷史與社群的連結以及論證內在生命(inner life)的道德意義之上。對她而言,個人不是一座空虛的孤島,而是充滿豐盈的生命內涵,並與他人和世界以及一套超越價值體系之間有著適當關聯的道德行動者,其道德性廣泛地表現在他對自我、他人、世界與價值,以及彼此關係的認知與回應。 基於上述理解,本論文採取梅朵獨特的取徑,試圖證明內在生命的道德性,並提出一個能夠包含行動者諸般內在生命狀態與活動的道德解釋模型,為道德能動性提出更為寬廣且豐厚的說明。論證步驟如下: 首先,為使道德行動者的內涵更為豐富,梅朵以「意識」(consciousness)作為「道德存有的基本模式」,將之界定為一套富含內在生命與價值聯結的能量系統,一方面使得道德自我成為包含活躍豐富之內在生命的連續體,另一方面亦重建起道德自我與價值之間的內在聯結。 第二,藉由「觀視」(vision)隱喻理解道德,建立起一套「道德觀視模型」(vision-model of morality),將道德界定為道德行動者不斷觀視自我與世界的連續歷程,使得道德活動不僅包含意志的選擇與行動,而是舉凡涉及到道德觀視的內在意識狀態或心理事件,諸如知覺、情感與想像力等都具道德意義。 第三,在柏拉圖的啟發下,梅朵將道德成長理解為行動者的道德視界同時也是意識能量品質的轉化與提昇,必須藉由對他者公正且慈愛的關注,才能使意識在善的光照與吸引之下逐漸實現從我執到無私的重新定向。而這也顯示在道德生活中重要的與負責任的不僅是行動實踐的意志力,還有導引意識能量同時提昇觀視品質的關注力。

並列摘要


In this dissertation I study the English novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy and develop an alternative account of moral agency by reconstructing her ethics of vision in terms of consciousness, vision, virtue and their relations. According to Iris Murdoch, the Sartrean existentialism and the Anglo-Saxon linguistic behaviourism (often called “the existentialist-behaviourist view”) embraces a constricted picture of morality and moral agency that not only pictures the moral agent as an isolated principle of rational will but locates the core of moral agency in the exertion of the will at the moment of choice, and in turn fails to take into account the moral significance of the agent’s inner lives, such as the quality of seeing, feeling and imagining. In order to broaden and deepen our understanding of the complexity and variety of human moral experience, Murdoch proposes an alternative model which conceives morality as the moral agent’s vision of and response to the complex moral world. In this model the locus of moral agency is broadened and the domain of ethics is extended in the sense that moral activities are no longer restricted to choice and action but include the agent’s perceptions, feelings, and imaginations of self and the world. My argument proceeds in three steps: After examining briefly Murdoch’s criticisms of Sartrean existentialism and the Anglo-Saxon linguistic behaviourism, I argue that Murdoch retrieves the concept of consciousness which consists of rich inner lives and value system to be the fundamental mode of moral being so that the moral lives are no longer restricted to choice and action but include the agent’s inner mental activities. Second, I argue that Murdoch employs the metaphor of vision by which morality is conceived as the moral agent’s seeing of and response to the complex moral world. On this view, not only the willed choice and action but the quality of our vision, feeling and imagining are all morally significant in themselves. Third, resorting to Plato’s philosophy, Murdoch conceives moral growth involving a transformation of the agent’s moral vision that is at the same time a progressively reorientation of consciousness from egoistic concern towards a selfless perspective through a just and loving attention towards others.

並列關鍵字

Iris Murdoch Simone Weil moral agency moral perception consciousness vision virtue attention love Eros

參考文獻


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