經理人報酬契約、內部人交易與購併媒介的關係

CEO Compensation Contracts, Insider Trading, and Exchange Mediums in Mergers and Acquisitions

葉星艷(Hsin-Yen Yeh)

指導教授 ： 陳其美

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2006.02109

摘要

我們藉由一個訊號模型討論當主併公司的控制股東與經理人可以勾
結進行內線交易時，主併公司的經理人報酬契約、購併媒介與內線交易之間的關係。在模型中，控制股東與經理人可以觀察到公司的私有資訊，勾結進行內線交易並秘密協議如何分配內線交易利潤。經理人的報酬契約包含分紅比例與內線交易的分配比例，其中，分紅比例會被市場觀察到，然而內線交易利潤的分配比例不會被市場觀察到。目標公司的管理者，會根據看到的主併公司經理人分紅比例與股票市場上的成交價格，決定是否提升營運效率而提高主併公司購併成本。我們說明購併機會的存在可能會影響主併公司控制股東的交易誘因，進而影響購併媒介的選擇與主併公司經理人的報酬契約，而其中購併媒介的選擇會影響證券市場的資訊效率性。對於實證現象顯示，在成功的購併中，主併公司的股價傾向下跌，然而目標公司的股東卻傾向獲利，我們也提供一個合理的解釋。我們認為，股價下跌與購併成功是市場看到一個低的分紅比例的平行反應，股價下跌是因為證券市場反映了主併公司之前被高估的價值，而購併成功是因為目標公司的管理者不作抵抗動作。目標公司股東可能獲利是因主倂公司欲使目標公司管理者在購併成功之後不要做出傷害公司價值的行為，因此提供目標公司股東較高股權。

關鍵字

經理人報酬契約 ； 內部人交易 ； 購併媒介

並列摘要

This paper intends to justify and explain the phenomenon that an acquiring firm’s share price tends to fall but a target firm’s shareholderstend to benefit because of the takeover. Besides, it considers the relationship between insider trading, productive efficiency, and the likelihood of subsequent takeover success when corporate insiders
can collude. We analyze the interactions between insiders' incentives to coordinate their trades and the explicit managerial compensation contracts in a two-audience signaling model where an acquiring firm’s
stock price reveals information to a target firm’s management, which can take defensive strategies to affect the likelihood of success when the acquiring firm attempts to take over the target firm. We show that concerns for the takeover gains may affect both the informational ef-
ficiency in the stock market and the pre-takeover incentive contract offered to the CEO’s of the acquiring firm. The theory offers a rational explanation to the well documented phenomenon that the price response to an announcement of takeover by the acquiring firm tends
to be negative but target firm’s shareholders tend to benefit because of the takeover. A lower contractual bonus may indicate a higher probability that the takeover may succeed and a price drop for the acquiring firm’s stock. The choice of exchange medium depends on both the expected takeover gains and the expected insider trading profits.

並列關鍵字

Compensation Contracts ； Insider Trading ； Exchange Mediums

參考文獻

21. Campbell, J., S. Grossman, and J. Wang, 1993, Trading volume and

1. Acharya, V. V., K. John, and R. K. Sundaram, 2000, On the optimality

13. Berkovitch, E., and N. Khanna, 1991, A theory of acquisition markets:

of resetting executive stock options, Journal of Financial Economics,

ownership structure and takeover defenses in determining acquisition