策略性貿易政策

Essays on Strategic Trade Policy

彭正浩(Cheng-Hau Peng)

指導教授 ： 黃鴻

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/博士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.02012

摘要

本論文利用策略性貿易模型探討政府政策對於廠商行為及市場均衡的影響。本文討論的議題包括：反傾銷政策對於外國廠商的最適設廠區位有何影響、存在上游廠商時關稅與其等量配額是否能得到相同的市場均衡價格以及當FDI可能發生時有效保護率該如何修正。

在第二章中，我們利用一個兩國兩廠商的空間競爭模型，討論當本國政府實施反傾銷政策時，是否會影響外國廠商直接投資（FDI）之決策。本章與過去文獻不同之處在於我們將外國廠商的區位選擇內生化；亦即，透過外國廠商的最適區位選擇來探討其FDI的決策。本章得到以下結論：（1）在自由貿易下外國廠商的最適區位為在外國設廠（角解）；而在本國政府實施反傾銷政策下，外國廠商之最適設廠區位會改變至兩國間（內解），亦即發生FDI。（2）兩國間之國界為影響外國廠商進行FDI的重要因素。當國界愈靠近外國時，外國廠商進行FDI的可能性愈高。（3）當外國廠商愈具有成本優勢時其進行FDI之可能性亦愈高，此一結論符合Blonigen (2002)的實證結果。

在第三章中，我們採用三國模型來探討當上游廠商存在時「關稅配額均等」是否成立。我們考慮了上游廠商的三種不同訂價策略，分別為：兩部訂價、差別訂價及單一訂價。本章發現：（1）當上游廠商採兩部訂價時，政府實施關稅下之最終財市場價格高於等量配額下（將該關稅下之進口量訂為進口配額）之價格。若上游廠商採差別訂價或單一訂價，則此結論相反。換言之，當上游廠商存在時，即使下游廠商進行數量競爭，「關稅配額均等」亦不成立。（2）假設配額租等於稅收時，若上游廠商採兩部訂價，政府實施關稅之社會福利低於等量配額下之社會福利。若上游廠商採兩部訂價或單一訂價則得到相反之結果。（3）本國社會福利在上游廠商採差別訂價或單一訂價下較高，則須視本國市場需求的大小而定。

第四章利用Anderson (1998) 對有效保護率的定義來討論FDI對於有效保護率的影響。本章得到以下的結論：（1）當FDI可能發生時，有效保護率的衡量不應只考慮本國政府對上下游商品所課徵之進口關稅。（2）外國廠商的設廠成本亦應該納入考量，該成本愈高則本國可訂定之有效保護率亦愈高。若外國廠商之設廠成本為零，則本國政府不可能對於本國廠商訂出正的有效保護率。此外，在本章之模型架構下，我們可將Anderson (1998) 之有效保護率公式轉換為 Corden之公式。換言之，本章之結論在 Corden (1966)之有效保護率公式下亦成立。

第五章總結本論文並提供往後研究的延伸議題。

關鍵字

策略性貿易 ； 反傾銷 ； 價格具結 ； 外人直接投資 ； 關稅配額均等 ； 垂直相關市場 ； 有效保護率

並列摘要

This dissertation, applying these most commonly used strategic trade models, explores issues on antidumping policy, foreign direct investment (FDI), tariffs and quotas equivalence and the effective rate of protection (ERP).

In Chapter 2, we employ a spatial competition model with one foreign firm competing with one domestic firm in the domestic market to examine how a domestic antidumping law affects the FDI-jumping decision of the foreign firm. It goes beyond previous studies by treating the FDI decision (i.e., the location of the foreign firm) as an endogenous and continuous variable which allows us to examine thoroughly the location pattern of the foreign firm. In this chapter, our major findings are: (i) The optimal location of the foreign firm is of corner solution under free trade, but it has an interior solution when it is subject to an antidumping law. (ii) The border of the nations is crucial to the FDI decision. FDI is more likely to take place if the border of the nations is closer to the foreign country. (iii) If the foreign firm has a cost advantage over the domestic firm, it is more likely for the foreign firm to engage in FDI which supports the empirical finding of Blonigen (2002).

In Chapter 3, we add an upstream firm to the Cournot model a la Hwang and Mai (1988) and examine the issue of tariffs and quotas equivalence under three different pricing strategies adopted by the upstream firm which include two-part tariff, discriminating pricing and uniform pricing. We find that the market price for the final good under a tariff is higher (lower) than that under the equivalent quota (i.e., the quota is set at the level of import under the tariff), if the upstream firm adopts two-part tariff pricing (discriminating pricing or uniform pricing). This result is in sharp contrast to the finding of Hwang and Mai (1988). We also compare the social welfare under free trade and that under the equivalent quota (i.e., the quota is set at the level of import under free trade). Surprisingly, the social welfare under free trade is necessarily lower than that under the equivalent quota. In addition to the case of two-part tariffs, we also study the cases in which the upstream firm adopts either discriminatory or uniform pricing.

Chapter 4 utilizes the ERP definition a la Anderson (1998) to highlight the impacts of FDI on ERP. Our major findings are as follows: First, when FDI is taken into account, the measurement of the ERP can not be determined solely by tariff rates on the final product and the intermediate good in the model. Second, FDI greenfield costs also play an important role in measuring the ERP. Moreover, it is impossible to have a positive ERP if the greenfield cost is zero. Finally, in this model, the impact of the FDI on ERP à la Anderson can also be applied to that of Corden.

Chpater 5 concludes the dissertation and provides some extensions from this research.

並列關鍵字

Strategic Trade Policy ； Antidumping ； Price Undertaking ； Foreign Direct Investment ； Tariffs and Quotas Equivalence ； Vertically Related Markets ； Effective Rate of Protection

參考文獻

Anderson, J. and S. Naya, 1969, “Substitution and Two Concepts of Effective Rate of Protection,” The American Economic Review 59, 607-612.

Anderson, J., 1998, “Effective Protection Redux,” Journal of International Economics 44, 21-44.

Barrell, R. and N. Pain, 1999, “Trade Restraints and Japanese Direct Investment Flows,” European Economic Review 43, 29-45.

Belderbos, R., H. Vandenbussche and R. Veugelers, 2004, “Antidumping Duties, Undertakings, and Foreign Direct Investment in the EU,” European Economic Review 48, 429-453.

Belderbos, R., 1997, “Antidumping and Tariff-Jumping: Japan Firms’ FDI in the European Union and United States,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133, 419-457.