透過您的圖書館登入
IP:18.223.171.12
  • 學位論文

海外可轉債、可轉債的發行與股東權益的關係

Convertible Bond Issuance, Shareholders Wealth and Corporate Governance

指導教授 : 李存修
共同指導教授 : 胡星陽(Shing-yang Hu)

摘要


可轉債和海外可轉債的發行在2002年和2003年快速成長,成為台灣公司熱門的籌資工資。但是,台灣公司發行海外可轉債與可轉債熱卻引起國內外投資人的質疑。因為若是海外可轉債與可轉債的發行條件優渥,加上承銷方式為投資銀行恰定特別人的方式銷售,買到的投資人會有套利機會,相對地稀釋掉其他投資人的權益而產生公司治理上的問題。 針對這個議題,本論文從海外可轉債與可轉債發行的三項契約條款進行實證研究探討。這三項條款方別為轉換價格中的基準價格和轉換溢價與是否有特別重設條款的設定。實證結果發現,公司治理確實會影響海外可轉債與可轉債轉換溢價與特別重設條款的設定。至於公司治理對條款中的基準價格在實證中並沒有顯著結果,尚有待後續文獻進行更深入的探究。

並列摘要


Euro Convertible Bonds (ECB) and domestic Convertible bonds (CB) have become popular financing instruments for Taiwanese corporations in recent years. However, there may be corporate governance problem associated with ECB and CB issuance. In addition, shareholders’ wealth may be diluted if bond indenture is not fair enough. This article investigates the possible dilution effect by reviewing three clauses setting on ECB and CB. Empirical results show that ECBs and CBs of firms with better corporate governance characteristics end to enjoy high conversion premium and to resist special reset clause.

參考文獻


1. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang, 2000, “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, no. 1, Nov, p. 81.
2. Claessens, Stijn, 2002, “Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, no. 6, Dec, pp. 2741-2772.
5. Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, 1997, “A survey of corporate governance”, Journal of Finance. Vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 737-784.
6. Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny, 1986, “Large shareholders and corporate control”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, no. 3, Jun, pp. 461-489.
7. Stein, J. C., 1992, “Convertible bonds as backdoor equity financing”, Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 32, no. 1, Aug, pp. 3-22.

延伸閱讀