本論文探討薪資高低、獎酬制度及兩者間的交互作用對員工工作績效的影響。Hannan (2005)研究顯示在固定工資的制度下,支付員工的工資越高,員工願意付出的努力越多(互惠理論)。但Hannan (2005)僅探討工資高低與員工付出努力程度的關係,並未進行實作以測知員工的工作績效。因此本研究擴展Hannan (2005)探討薪資高低與工作績效的關係,並將不同的獎酬制度納入研究範圍,以研究上述關係在不同薪酬制度的適用程度。研究主題有三,(1)探討互惠理論在固定薪酬制度之敘述效度。(2)探討在變動薪酬制度下,互惠理論是否依然適用。(3)探討採用變動薪酬制度的員工是否較採用固定薪酬制度的員工有更好的工作績效。 本研究採實驗設計,實驗結果顯示在固定薪酬制度下,員工的工作績效受到財務獎酬(固定工資)金額之影響。而在變動薪酬制度下,卻顯示員工的工作績效與薪資率之關係並不顯著。另外獎酬制度的種類亦將顯著影響員工的工作績效,顯示獎酬制度與財務獎酬金額的交互作用將對員工之工作績效產生影響。
This study investigates whether paying higher wages motivates employees to have better performance and whether performance-based incentive scheme (piece rate vs. fixed pay) moderates this relation. Prior researches (Hannan 2005、Kocher and Sutter 2007 ) document that workers provided more effort when they were paid higher wages even though there was no ex post financial reward for doing so. Therefore, instead of the level of effort, this study uses actual worker’s task performance to examine whether this effect exists. In addition, this study takes account of incentive scheme to investigate whether this effect exists. A computerized experiment between-subject design is conducted to test the following hypotheses: H1: Workers have better task performance when they are paid higher wages. H2: Workers have better task performance when they are paid higher piece rates. H3: Compared to workers receiving a fixed pay, workers receiving an incentive-based pay (piece rate) perform better on the task. The experimental results suggest that H1 is supported. Namely, workers who were paid higher wages will perform better than workers who were paid lower wages. However, the relation between piece rates and employees’ task performance is not significant. Finally, H3 is supported, which suggest that incentive scheme can affect worker’s task performance. In other words, there is an interactive effect between incentive scheme and the amount of wages on performance.