透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.144.212.145
  • 學位論文

維根斯坦的私用語言論證

Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument

指導教授 : 劉福增
共同指導教授 : 曾漢塘

摘要


本篇論文的目的是,「把生命形式為使用語言的基礎」的觀點之下理解《哲學探究》,尤其是對私用語言論證的理解。 為了討論私用語言論證,先要理解整個《哲學探究》的思想,所以筆者在序章中介紹筆者對《哲學探究》的理解。其內容包括語言遊戲、實指定義、家族類似性和哲學。 第一章討論遵守規則。維根斯坦說:「人們不可能『私人地』遵守規則」,所以遵守規則是公共的。但是關於這個公共性有「實際上的分享」與「分享的可能性」的爭論。筆者從支持「分享的可能性」的立場,並且指出生命形式是遵守規則以及使用語言的基礎。第一章的討論間接地支持第三章的討論。 第二章討論私用語言論證。筆者先確認「我覺得痛」或「他覺得痛」是在我們的實踐中有意義的表述。接著討論私用語詞「S」的不可能,並且指出「對記憶的懷疑論」的解釋是錯誤的。再來確認「我痛」和「他痛」的不對稱。語言的看起來的相似性蠱惑我們,但是對所有東西的懷疑是不可能的。 第三章討論庫律基(S. A. Kripke)的社群觀。庫律基認為《哲學探究》的主題是休謨式懷疑論的問題和它的解決。但是這個《哲學探究》的解釋不僅與維根斯坦的文本衝突,也與我們的實踐衝突。筆者指出庫律基的誤解和他的主張引起的困難。

並列摘要


The purpose of this thesis is to understand Philosophical Investigations (especially, its “private language argument”). I will understand it under the view point where form of life is the basis of language usage. In order to discuss about “private language argument”, one has to understand the whole thought of Philosophical Investigations, therefore, I will introduce my understanding about Philosophical Investigations in the preliminary. It contains language-game, ostensive definition, family-resemblance and philosophy. In the first chapter, I will discuss rule-following. Wittgenstein said, “it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’”. Therefore rule-following is public. However, there are arguments about this public character, i.e. whether the practice must be actually shared or sharable. I will endorse the view of sharable practice and point out that the basis of rule-following and language usage is form of life. The discussion of the first chapter supports the third chapter indirectly. In the second chapter, I will discuss private language argument. The first thing I will confirm is “I feel pain” and “he feels pain” these two expressions have sense in our practices. Next will I discuss impossibility of a private word “S” and point out a kind of interpretation which insists skepticism about memory is wrong. Thereafter I will make the asymmetry between “I’m in pain” and “he is in pain” clear. Apparent similarities in language make us bewitched, but we don’t doubt everything. In the third chapter, I will discuss S. A. Kripke’s community view. Kripke thinks that the main theme of Philosophical Investigations is Humean skeptical problem and it’s solution, but this interpretation of Philosophical Investigations is not only incompatible with Wittgenstein’s texts but also with our practices. I will point out Kripke’s misunderstanding and problems which his interpretation entails.

參考文獻


G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Malcolm on language and rules’, Philosophy, 65, pp.167-79, 1990.
——, Scepticism, Rules & Language, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984.
——, Wittgenstein Understanding and Meaning, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980.
S. Candlish, ‘The Real Private Language Argument’, Philosohy 55, p. 85-94, 1980.
J. V. Canfield, ‘Private language: the diary case’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, pp. 377-94, 2001.

延伸閱讀