正式政治VS.非正式政治： 從制度化與派系因素解讀中共省級人事權力的行使

Formal politics VS. Informal Politics: The Impact of Institutional and Factional Factors on Chinese Personnel Appointment at Provincial Level

黃國鈞(Kuo-Chun Huang)

指導教授 ： 陶儀芬

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.02217

摘要

摘要
中共自八零年代開始進行分權式的經濟改革，使省級政府成為發展地方經濟的要角，同時也出現高漲的經濟地方主義。在這樣的背景之下，本文以中共的政權結構作為分析起點，試圖釐清在「極權政體」（totalitarian regime）轉型的脈絡下，中央透過人事任免權力(nomenklatura system)的行使，對地方主義興起的主要制度創新之回應。本文以正式制度與派系因素作為兩個主要的解釋變項，具體的以省級幹部制度的發展與「上海幫」派系的興衰為研究對象，一方面梳理、檢証中央行使省級人事任免權力時，所衍生的制度化規範；同時，觀察派系因素在此過程中的影響。

本文認為中央透過行使省級人事權回應地方主義的結果，呈現出一組複雜的圖像：首先，省級幹部制度的發展反應了中央對地方主義的控制，而中央賦予省長較特殊的地位，並有規律的甄補省級領導人，則反應對地方主義的妥協，顯示中央與地方關係趨向動態平衡。其次，「上海幫」的案例顯示，中央制度化約束與甄補省級領導人的過程一方面對派系產生明顯的約束，另一方面卻出現派系領導人藉此擴大派系權力的非意圖性結果（unintended consequence）。不過整體而言，中共政治似乎出現「派系輪替」（faction alternation）的現象，使中共的派系菁英相對平和的交替執政。

關鍵字

中央人事任免權 ； 幹部制度 ； 政治制度化 ； 派系輪替 ； 上海幫 ； 中央與地方關係

並列摘要

Abstract

Since early 1980's, the Chinese government started the economic reform
by decentralizing its administrative decision power. As a result, the provincial government became the main promoter to develop local economy, and it caused rampant localism simultaneously. In such background, this article takes a structural perspective, the transition of totalitarian regime, and tries to clarify how the central, including the party and state, utilized the totalitarian legacy, personnel appointment power (nomenklatura system) and its institutional innovation, to curb localism in the transitional progress.

This article assumes that institutional and factional factors are the two main independent variables to explain how the central utilized the personnel power to respond to localism. Specifically, We observe provincial cadre management institutions and the ‘‘Shanghai Gang’’ faction as research objects for clarifying the central’s institutional innovation to control localism and the role of faction in this process.

Our research argues that the manipulation of personnel appointment power
by the central has demonstrated a complicated picture. First of all, the central-local relation tends to reach a dynamic equilibrium. The central’s control of localism has been reflected by the development of provincial cadre management institutions, however the central’s compromise to localism, such as the provincial governor’s localization and regular promotion of provincial leaders, has also been shown by empirical evidences. Secondly, the case study of the ‘‘Shanghai Gang’’ faction indicates that the central’s institutionalized control and promotion has resulted an obvious limit to factions on the one hand, but on the other hand, the central faction’s leader had also promoted his clients through this process as an unintended consequence. However, the whole picture shows that ‘‘faction alternation’’ seems to exist in Chinese elite politics, and it brought a relative peaceful power rotation between factions.

並列關鍵字

personnel appointment power (nomenklatura system) ； cadre management institutions ； political institutionalization ； faction alternation ； Shanghai Gang ； central-local relation

參考文獻

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