從公司治理視角論股東代位訴訟-以韓日美立法架構之比較出發

Derivative Suits From the Lens of the Corporate Governance -A Research Based upon Korea,Japan and United States Legal System

呂靜玟(Ching-Wen Lu)

指導教授 ： 王文宇

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201610389

摘要

台灣企業股權結構因歷史因素而形成控制權與現金流量權極度偏離之控制股東系統。復以公司法對於控制股東之規範之疲軟以及對少數股東規範保障之不足。從而本文檢討現有代表訴訟之規定，分析我國代表訴訟之法制結構是否適於少數股東之救濟手段，而足以建構公司治理之目標。代表訴訟經濟誘因框架之建構，即為激勵少數股東提起訴訟之手段之一。

法律制度移植後的法律實踐，是一連串法律適應之過程，受到受移植國的社會脈絡因素影響，其中最深遠者為社會文化。本文以功能性比較法學方法，借鏡與我國具相同東亞文化背景日本及韓國，探討日本代表訴訟爆炸性成長之原因。以往文獻多從經濟學觀點的成本獲利分析嘗試探討日本股東、律師提起訴訟之原因，本文以實證資料解構原告股東及律師提起訴訟為經濟誘因及理性之假設。本文藉由探討行為人做成決策心理過程的行為經濟學理論出發，從另一個視角探尋日本代表訴訟之崛起。

最後從驅策代表訴訟之組織出發，分析非營利組織及律師驅策之利弊。本文就我國證券及期貨投資人保護中心與日本、韓國非營利組織之組成架構加以比較，並分析其作為保護少數股東過渡性機制之可行性。本文認為最終應回歸市場機制，給予律師誘因驅策訴訟，由律師驅動訴訟，帶動群眾跟隨趨勢之心理，形塑內化公司治理的文化。

關鍵字

代表訴訟 ； 少數股東救濟機制 ； 控制股東 ； 日本代表訴訟 ； 韓國代表訴訟 ； 非營利組織 ； 律師驅策 ； 後酬約定

並列摘要

This paper studies a controlling shareholder system in which control and cash flow rights are separated, seen frequently in Taiwanese corporations due to historical reasons. Corporate laws in Taiwan lack the appropriate mechanisms that regulate controlling shareholders and provide protection for minority shareholders. This paper examines the regulations of derivative suits. It subsequently analyzes whether the regulatory framework facilitates good corporate governance by affording the necessary remedies for minority shareholders in case that their rights are infringed. Reforming the framework of economic incentives of derivative suits regulations is a way to encourage the minority shareholders to take necessary legal action.

The formation of legal practices following the adoption of a legal system requires a long process of legal adaptations. Such a process is influenced by many social factors, with culture playing the most significant role. This paper reviews the factors for the explosive growth of derivative suits in Japan in a functional comparative laws approach. The literature studies the incentives for plaintiff shareholders and attorneys through the lens of cost-benefit analysis. This paper advances the relevant literature by deconstructing the assumption of economic motivated and rational shareholders with empirical evidence. The theory of the behavioral economics expounds the mental processes of a normal human being making decisions, allowing us to explain the growth of Japanese derivative suits with a different perspective.

Finally, this paper analyzes the pros and cons of non-profit organizations and attorneys as litigation initiators. Comparing the organizational structure of the Securities and Futures Investor Protection Center in Taiwan、Shareholder Ombudsman People's in Japan ands Solidarity for Participatory Democracy in Korea, the paper analyzes the feasibility of using such non-profit organizations as a transitional mechanism to protect minority shareholders. This paper concludes that market mechanism provides the best mechanism for minority shareholders protection. To cultivate good corporate governance culture, the regulations should provide the appropriate economic incentives for attorneys, allowing them to take the lead for trend-following crowds.

並列關鍵字

derivative suits ； controlling shareholder ； minority shareholder remedies ； Japan derivative suits ； Korean derivative suits ； non-profit organization ； attorney-driven ； contingent fee

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