控制權與所有權之偏離只存在侵略效果？來自擴增控制權組織與盈餘品質間關連性之證據

Is the control-ownership deviation always “parasites”? Evidence from control-enhancing organizations and earnings quality

王泓達(Hong-Da Wang)

指導教授 ： 林嬋娟

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/博士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.02240

摘要

無資料

關鍵字

家族企業 ； 集團企業 ； 金字塔結構 ； 交叉持股 ； 內部資本市場 ； 控制權與所有權偏離 ； 盈餘品質

並列摘要

Pyramiding and cross shareholdings, among the most common mechanisms adopted by family businesses or business groups for control-enhancing, are deemed as expropriation tools over minority shareholders, and thus blamed for lower level of earnings quality. In this study I try to investigate if the utilization of pyramiding and (or) cross shareholdings (measured by the deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights) could also serve as a tool to mitigate earnings management due to slack in debt contracting.
Empirical analyses show that good or bad family firms, from the perspectives of earnings quality, can be derived by separating family firms based on the degree of deviation of control from ownership, Moreover, despite that the deviation is positively related to abnormal accruals over a deviation threshold, the deviation is negatively associated with the extent of earnings management in family or group firms with low deviation, indicating the dominance of internal capital market below a deviation threshold.
Additional analyses show that family and group firms are less conservative in the extent to which loss and gain are asymmetrically recognized. Besides, investors are sensitive to the board representation of controlling shareholders, thus demanding more conservatism when controlling shareholders occupy more board seats.

並列關鍵字

family firms ； business groups ； pyramidal groups ； cross shareholdings ； internal capital market ； deviation of control from ownership ； earnings quality

參考文獻

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