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  • 學位論文

向左轉或向右轉?政黨降低立法背叛率之事後誘因機制探尋

Ex Post Incentives for Parties to Lower Defection Rate in Roll Call Votes

指導教授 : 張佑宗

摘要


本文以政黨作為國會立法的行動者為前提,藉由政黨的提名權與連任成功作為事後誘因機制,檢證是否能夠因此降低立法背叛率,且以實際運作三黨不過半的第三屆立法院作為研究範圍,並試圖比較對照國、民兩黨的差異。 就提名模型而言,研究結果發現「擔任政黨幹部」與「法律主提案數」愈多者,愈容易獲得政黨提名。在記名投票背叛率上,對政黨提名與否產生正向的影響關係,意味著背叛率越高,越容易獲得政黨提名,其最大的原因在於第四屆立委選舉時,應選名額由第三屆的164人增加到225人,當名額增加且以勝選為前提的考量下,各政黨莫不以「現任者」甚至是具「地方派系背景」者為優先提名對象,因而未顧及黨籍成員的政黨忠誠度為何。另外,在連任模型方面,研究結果發現「擔任委員會幹部」對立委的連任成功與否產生負向的影響關係,這可能代表我國委員會運作尚未成熟與資深制的缺乏;而「與總統同一政黨」、「非負面新聞」及「地方派系」等因素則對立委連任成功與否皆產生正向的影響關係,在加入「政黨提名」之變數後,其亦如理論預期達到統計上的顯著水準。 有鑑於此,單就第三屆之於第四屆立法委員選舉而言,政黨的提名權力與立委的連任成功與否並未能成為降低立法背叛率的事後誘因機制,然而這樣的研究發現是否僅止適用於第三屆,抑或是能夠加以推論到其他屆期,則有待後續研究者更進一步的驗證。

並列摘要


The main purpose of this thesis is to find out how to lower defection rate in roll call votes using “ex post incentives of parties” as nomination and reelection. The scope of this research is the third term of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan which included KMT and DPP. The analysis of nomination model shows that“party position”and“main law proposal”both have positive effects on nomination. Besides, the coefficient of“defection rate”in roll call votes is also positive, which means the higher the defection rate in roll call votes, the easier nominated by parties. The reason may be that the number of total seats in the Legislative Yuan increased to 225 in the fourth term legislature election in 1998. In order to win office and maximize seats, candidates who are incumbents and accompanied with local factions have the highest priority to be nominated instead of considering their loyalty to party. Furthermore, reelection model shows that“committee chairperson”has negative effect on reelection because the autonomy of standing committees and seniority is weak in LY. However,“president’s coattail effect”,“non-negative news”and“local faction”all significantly and positively affect the reelection. Moreover, as we expected, the coefficient of nomination variable reached the 0.05 level in the reelection model. Due to the third term of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, it is found no significant evidence to support ex post incentives to lower defection rate in roll call votes. But this inference may need more evidence to be proved in the future.

參考文獻


徐永明、陳鴻章,2004,〈地方派系與國民黨:衰退還是深化〉,《台灣社會學》,(8):193-228。
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林佳龍,2001,〈台灣民主化與政黨體系的變遷:菁英與群眾的選舉連結〉,《台灣政治學刊》,4:3-55。
吳宜侃,2005,〈立法委員連任預測模型分析-以第四屆立法委員為例〉,《選舉研究》,12 (1):173-210。
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被引用紀錄


鍾政輝(2009)。立法院議事策略之研究〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU.2009.02705

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