董事會屬性、平衡計分卡與企業營運績效之關聯性

許嫚戎(Man-Jung Hsu)

指導教授 ： 杜榮瑞

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.02399

摘要

學說上有關董事會屬性與企業營運績效關係之文獻，迄今說法不一，尚無定論。本研究認為學說研究上不一致的情形可能係因，沒有考慮公司管理控制機制與董事會屬性交互作用的影響。董事會主要係對企業營運目標、企業遠景與願景負責，而一個有效的管理控制機制則能確實企業營運策略之執行，平衡計分卡正為一能將企業策略轉換為具體行動的管理控制工具。因此，本研究目的在探討平衡計分卡實施程度與董事會屬性之交互作用對企業營運績效之影響，希冀以平衡計分卡之實施程度為調節董事會與企業營運績效關係之機制，促使董事會與企業營運績效的關係趨於一致。
本研究係按2003年底前上市上櫃公司，刪除遺漏值及不含金融股、全額交割股等，企業實施平衡計分卡程度的資料採問卷方式，其它董事會屬性變數資料則取自各公司之年報、財務報表與台灣經濟新報資料庫。總共取得78個有效樣本，採用基本分析、相關分析與迴歸分析等方法對樣本資料加以分析。
實證結果如下：
一、企業實施平衡計分卡程度高低與董事會規模兩者之交互作
用，與企業營績效有負面顯著關係。
二、獨立董事人數或比例、實施平衡計分卡及兩者之交互作
用，均與企業營績效無顯著相關。
三、獨立董事中，具有會計背景的董事人數及比例與平衡計分
卡之實施程度，各對ROA及ROE有顯著正向關係；兩者相互
配之交互作用與企業營運績ROA有顯著正相關。
四、獨立董事中，具有管理專業背景之董事、實施平衡計分卡
與兩者之交互作用，均對企業營運績效無顯著影響。
實證結果顯示，董事會規模、具有會計專業背景之獨立董事兩者分別與平衡計分卡相配合，能確實提高企業營運績效；另一方面獨立董事、具有管理專業背景之獨立董事兩者與平衡計分卡之交互作用，則與企業營運績效無顯著相關。

關鍵字

企業管理控制機制 ； 公司治理 ； 董事會 ； 平衡計分卡 ； 企業營運績效

並列摘要

Extant research on the relationship between board of directors and corporate performance yields mixed findings. The inconsistent findings may be due to the lack of consideration of interactive effects among corporate control mechanisms. Board of directors is largely responsible for the formulation of corporate objectives, missions, and strategies. An effective corporate control system, however, also requires enforceable implementation of the strategies. The balanced scorecard (BSC) has been suggested as an enforceable control mechanism for strategy implementation. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the interactive effect of board of directors and balanced scorecard implementation on corporate performance.
Chief financial officers (CFOs) of listed companies in Taiwan are solicited to respond to the questionnaire on the degree of BSC implementation in their companies. The data for the other variables are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal database. The results based on 78 useful responses are as follows:
1. The interaction between board size and BSC
implementation has a significant and positive
effect on corporate performance.
2.There is no significant interactive effect between
independent directors (in terms of absolute number
of independent directors and relative proportion of
independent directors) and BSC implementation on
corporate performance.
3.There is a significant and positive interactive
effect between accounting expertise of independent
directors and BSC implementation on corporate
performance.
4.There is no significant interactive effect between
general management expertise of independent
directors and BSC implementation on corporate
performance.
In summary, the findings indicate that the interactions between board size and accounting expertise of independent directors, on the one hand, and BSC implementation, on the other hand, have significant and positive effects on corporate performance. Implications and limitations are offered.

並列關鍵字

Corporate control ； Corporate governance ； Board of directors ； Balanced scorecard ； Performance

參考文獻

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