An Essay on Game Theory: Rationalizable Behavior under Coalitional Interactions

An Essay on Game Theory: Rationalizable Behavior under Coalitional Interactions

楊智鈞(Chih-Chun Yang)

指導教授 ： 羅曉

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2006.02674

摘要

無資料

關鍵字

Rationalizability ； Coalition ； Bayes Updating

並列摘要

We extend Ambrus’s [QJE, 2006] concept of “coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability)” to situations where, in seeking mutual beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations –i.e.
the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, not only against restricted subsets of strategies. In this paper we offer an alternative notion of c-rationalizability suitable for such complicated interactions. More specifically, following Bernheim’s [Econometrica 52(1984), 1007-1028] and Pearce’s[Econometrica 52(1984), 1029-1051] approach, we define c-rationalizability by the terminology “coalitional rationalizable set (CRS)”. Roughly speaking, a CRS is a
product set of pure strategies from which no group of player(s) would like to deviate. We show that this notion of c-rationalizability possesses nice properties similar to those of conventional rationalizability. We also provide its epistemic foundation. JEL Classification: C70,
C72, D81

並列關鍵字

Rationalizability ； Coalition ； Bayes Updating

參考文獻

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