應用賽局理論探討信用擔保機制於供應鏈採購模式之研究

Applying Game Theory to Credit Guarantee Mechanism on supply Chain Sourcing Model

葉明憲(Ming-Hsien Yeh)

指導教授 ： 蔣明晃

共同指導教授 ： 郭瑞祥

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.10892

摘要

中小企業在臺灣扮演著舉足輕重的角色，不但與大企業形成完整的供應鏈，也是就業機會的主要提供者，除此還可以避免產業結構被少數企業壟斷，而許多大企業更是由中小企業演化而成，說明中小企業對穩定臺灣整體經濟環境與國家發展息息相關，中小企業發展未來仍將是經濟發展的基礎重心所在。
　　中小企業成長時需要資金融通，然而卻因其資訊不透明、財會制度不健全等因素，造成銀行授信時在資訊不對稱、不易評估風險且銀行基於本身權益，各項貸款均需要實質擔保條件下，使得無力提供擔保品的中小企業，常成為銀行融資體系下弱勢族群之一。然而政府信保基金的介入助益有限，因此本研究轉而探討透過單純供應鏈之間大型企業與銀行間達成違約時債務分攤協議，提供上游中小企業信用擔保，並確保銀行放款後的期望投資報酬，降低銀行的風險，提升銀行放款意願，進而達到供應鏈雙方與銀行三方皆贏的模式。
　　本研究為此建構一領導者與追隨者的賽局模型，將上游製造商視為追隨者，下游大型製造商視為領導者，在雙方追求極大化自身利潤下建立供應鏈採購模型，透過由後往前解獲得各種狀況下雙方之最佳決策與利潤，再對重要因子進行敏感度分析並提出結論，冀望可以提供未來供應鏈運作時，當有融資需求的一個解決方法，做為決策參考依據。

關鍵字

中小企業 ； 信用擔保機制 ； 供應鏈 ； 賽局

並列摘要

Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) have been a major force in Taiwan.They not only play the part as a bridge between larger enterprises and the suppliers but also refrain the industrial supply chain from controlled by single monopolists. Employment opportunities are also created by SME for the society. Moreover, most of Taiwanese large enterprises were evolved from SME which demonstrated the importance of existence of SMEs in the local business environment. In short, SMEs are essential foundations for the economic development in Taiwan.
However, due to low transparency of financial information and unhealthy financial/accounting system, for reduce the risk of loaning, SMEs are required to provide collateralization as grantee when applying for financial support. While few supports from the governmental side, this requirements turn out to be a barrier for small scale SMEs who are unable to provide such proof. As a result, this study is aimed to discuss the Credit Guarantee when the violation of contract between large enterprises and bank occurs, providing collateralization of upstream SMEs as well as the expected return after the loan of bank, in order to reduce the risk of loaning and increase the wiliness of loaning, in hope to achieve the win-win situation for suppliers and bank.
A leader-follower game is introduced in this paper, with the upstream suppliers as a follower, downstream suppliers as a leader. Both sides of the suppliers are seeking for profit maximization and build up supply chain purchase model. Backward calculation starts from obtaining the optimal decision and profit maximization result which lead to the sensitivity analysis on important factors as well as the conclusion. The result is projected to provide reference and solutions to the loaning decision marking process for all parties in the financial supply chain.

並列關鍵字

Small and Medium Enterprise ； Credit Guarantee ； Supply Chain ； Game Theory

參考文獻

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