《大智度論》對部派佛教實在論之批判的研究

An Investigation into the Mahaprajnaparamitopadesa's Critique of the Abhidharmic Realism

嚴瑋泓(Wei-Hung Yen)

指導教授 ： 蔡耀明

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/博士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.10711

摘要

本文之目的在於透過《大智度論》批判部派佛教實在論之哲學觀點的探究，揭露佛教中觀哲學如何處理真理與實在的課題。

為使論述聚焦，導論區分部派佛教實在論為「形上實在論」與「知識實在論」兩種類型，原因在於部派實在論的哲學主張與論證乃將形上學與知識學的結構交互為用，這樣的區分將有助於釐清其哲學思路。

第二章以探討《大智度論》作為釋經體例的文本特性為始，進而從論中多樣的思想中，論證其核心哲學課題為「諸法實相」（經驗表象的全面實在性），據此釐定《大智度論》批判部派佛教實在論的立場。此外，本章並證明其主要批判對象為「說一切有部」，也指出其批判的焦點在於主張「認識對象」須為實在的預設。然而，本文指出這樣的預設並不能保證知識的真。

第三章聚焦於「三世實有」、「時間」、「因果關係」與「有」等議題探討《大智度論》對部派佛教形上實在論的批判立場。部派佛教實在論從認識對象為實的素樸實在論開始，進而主張「時間」、「因果關係」以及「有」均必須實在，甚至預設「極微」作為存在背後的基石。本文指出，《大智度論》的批判理由在於此種預設非但不能作為真理的保證，反而會導致人們對於世界的不當理解。而《大智度論》的批判理路也揭示其以空性作為詮釋經驗表象之所以然的理由，因此在批判實體形上學之後，則表現為空性形上學的哲學立場。

第四章反思《大智度論》與部派實在論關於認識經驗的全面實在性如何可能的問題。論述焦點在於部派佛教實在論與《大智度論》兩者間觀點的差異，其中議題包含了「行相」與「無相」的不同主張，兩者對於「滅諦」能否為「所緣」的不同詮釋，及以「有為法三相」解釋經驗無常的理論是否為實的不同觀點。這些差異均顯示出兩者對於以認識對象為實作為認識之所以可能的基礎有著相當大的歧見。本章論證《大智度論》的批判部派佛教知識實在論的進路，除了揭示認識對象為實不能保證知識的真外，也揭露經驗世界中認識對象的不穩定性與認識活動的虛妄性，並從無相、無緣、無所得的知識型態，來論述《大智度論》之認識實在的進路。

在批判之後，第五章探究的議題從早期佛教到部派佛教對於「量」的討論雛型開始，進而探究《大智度論》「無量」的知識學意義。據此，指出《大智度論》主張一般世人無法透過有限的知識方法或測度標準來認識經驗的全面真實性。再者，從《大智度論》論述「比知」的觀點中，探討其對說一切有部界說十智觀點的繼承與批判。據此論證其對於推論知識所抱持的態度有其肯定，也有否定之處。此外，《大智度論》將「現量」與解脫者之認識結構接軌，也開顯了其以「無相」、「無量」作為表現型態的知識學。本文指出，《大智度論》主張知識的真建立在諸多條件的和合，此種立場揭露了經驗知識的不穩定性與非恆真性。而其無相、無量的知識學結構，乃直接認識存有世界的實在性為相續不斷的緣起生滅，也對依賴任何具體或抽象的認識對象為實的知識學預設，進行不間斷的解構。由於《大智度論》將這樣的知識學型態連結到解脫智慧的成就者，因此本文認為其表現為解脫知識學的理路。

第六章總結本論文的研究成果。從《大智度論》對部派實在論的批判中，探究論中所呈現之佛教內部的思想、哲學論述與論諍焦點，藉此彰顯《大智度論》的哲學價值。本章指出《大智度論》在批判認識對象不必然為實之後，以無所得之知識學視角，搭配「無相」、「無量」的認識標準與方法，藉以作為認識經驗表象之全面實在性的路徑。最後，以「空性形上學」與「解脫知識學」總結《大智度論》對部派佛教實在論的批判與其哲學意蘊。

關鍵字

《大智度論》 ； 部派佛教 ； 說一切有部 ； 實在論 ； 形上實在論 ； 知識實在論 ； 空性形上學 ； 解脫知識學

並列摘要

Via an investigation into the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa’s (hereafter abbreviated as MPPU) critique of Abhidharmic realism the main aim of this dissertation is to disclosing the manner in which Mādhyamika philosophy deals with the topic of truth and reality .

For the sake of clarity and focus, I shall divide Abhidharmic realism into metaphysical realism and epistemic realism. Because Abhidharmic realism usually intermingles metaphysical reasoning with epistemological arguments, differentiating between these two approaches will be helpful in gaining a clearer understanding of its philosophical ideas.

In the beginning of second chapter, I investigate the textual nature of the MPPU as a commentary to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, and based on various philosophical perspectives in this text, I demonstrate that the ‘thorough reality of all dharmas’ (sarvadharmāṇām bhutalakṣaṇam) is the main philosophical issue at hand. Accordingly, I formulate the grounds for MPPU’s critique of Abhidharmic realism. Apart from this, the chapter proves that the MPPU’s main target of criticism is the Sarvāstivāda and further indicates that the focus of the critique is the presupposition that cognitive objects ought to be real. I point out that such a presupposition is no guarantee for true knowledge.

The third chapter is an inquiry into the criticism of the Abhidharmic metaphysical realism via the issues of existence of dharmas in the three periods of time, time (kāla or samaya), causal relationship, and existence (bhava). Abhidharmic realism starts with the naïve realistic viewpoint that the objects of cognition are real, and then moves on to claim that time, causal relationship, and existence should be real, and even going so far as to suggest that the atom (paramāṇu) is the foundation behind all existence. I attempt to show that the MPPU criticizes Abhidharmic presuppositions not only because they fail as a support for truth, but also bring about misunderstanding of the world. Furthermore, the MPPU’s critical approach also discloses its own position on emptiness as the reason for Being qua Being. Hence, following the critique of substantial metaphysics, it offers its own metaphysics of emptiness.

The fourth chapter reflects on the arguments of both the MPPU and Abhidharmic realism regarding the problem of how cognizance of the ‘thorough reality of all dharmas’ is possible. The focus of the discussion falls on the different viewpoints of Abhidharmic realism and the MPPU, including varying standpoints on issues such as ‘perceptual image’ (ākāra) and ‘imagelessness’ (animitta), different views on whether the ‘image of cessation’ can function as an ‘object of cognition’ (ālambana), as well as various perspectives on whether the theory of ‘three images of conditioned dharmas’ is real or not. All these views reveal the marked discrepancies that exist between the MPPU and Abhidharmic realism on views related to the notion of cognitive objects being real as the foundation for the possibility of cognition. In this chapter, I argue that the MPPU’s criticisms of Abhidharmic realism not only reveals that the supposed reality of objects of cognition does not guarantee true knowledge, but also exposes the unstable nature of objects of cognition and fabricated characteristics of cognition. Moreover, it sets forth the MPPU’s approach to cognize reality from within the epistemic framework of ‘imagelessness’, ‘no object of cognition’, and ‘non-apprehension’ (anupalambha).

Following the critique, the fifth chapter starts with an inquiry into issues such as the criteria set for valid knowledge (pramāṇa) from early Buddhism to Abhidharma Buddhism, thereupon exploring the epistemic significance of the MPPU’s concept of ‘being immeasurable’ (apramāṇa). I point out accordingly that the MPPU maintains that ordinary persons cannot know the ‘thorough reality of all dharmas’ by means of limited methods or standards of measure. Moreover, within the context of inference (anumāna), I inquire into the MPPU’s succession and critique of ‘ten knowledge’ as advanced by the Sarvāstivādins. Through this inquiry, we may find that the MPPU’s holds both positive and negative attitudes towards inference. Further, the MPPU establishes a link between ‘direct perception’ (pratyakṣa) with the cognitive structure of the liberated individual, and also discloses an epistemology typified by ‘imagelessness’ and ‘being immeasurable’. I show that the MPPU claims that true knowledge arises from several causes and conditions – a position which reveals that experiential knowledge is not steady and true universally. In addition, the MPPU’s epistemic framework of ‘imagelessness’ and ‘immeasurability’ is a form of direct cognizance of the reality of the living world which itself exists as an uninterrupted gathering of causes and conditions, and as such serves to deconstruct an epistemic dependence upon on either concrete or abstract objects of cognition assumed to be endlessly real. Since the MPPU connects this epistemic framework with the liberated individual, I define this approach as an epistemology of liberation (mokṣa).

The sixth chapter is a summary of the research outcomes of this dissertation. Firstly, it highlights the philosophical significance of the MPPU through its critique of Abhidharmic realism and explores the ideology, philosophical arguments and focal points of debates amongst the Buddhist schools. Following a critique of the presupposition that cognitive objects must be real, the MPPU adopts the epistemic perspective of ‘non-apprehension’, and matches up the cognitive method and criteria for valid knowledge of ‘imagelessness’ and ‘immeasurability’ as the path toward cognizing the ‘thorough reality of all dharmas’. Finally, this dissertation concludes the MPPU’s critique of Abhidharmic realism with a discussion of the philosophical implications of its metaphysics of emptiness and epistemology of liberation.

並列關鍵字

Mahaprajnaparamitopadesa ； Abhidharma Buddhism ； Sarvastivada ； realism ； metaphysical realism ； epistemic realism ； metaphysics of emptiness ； epistemology of liberation

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---------　〈論《般若經》的「假名」概念－以《大般若波羅蜜多經•第四會》〈妙行品〉與《第二會》〈善現品〉的對比作為考察的基礎－〉，《中華佛學研究》，第10期，臺北：中華佛學研究所，2006年3月，頁43-70。