董事聲譽與 S&P 500 公司不稱職總裁的適時離職

REPUTATION OF THE BOARDS AND THE TIMELY DEPARTURE OF UNDERPERFORMING CEOs AT S&P 500 FIRMS

李喬志(JORGE MARIO LEE TOBON)

指導教授 ： 胡星陽

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.03020

摘要

本研究論文驗證了S&P 500公司的不稱職總裁之任期期間的長短，會受到董事聲譽某些程度的影響。 年輕的外部董事在監控總裁的效率方面，比較接近退休年紀的董事好，此現象尤其是以2000年後的樣本期間更為明顯。 而大部分任職多家公司董事會的多重董事，他們以股東的利益為導向的行為較不顯著。 另外，若公司的市場績效表現不佳，董事會將因壓力而解僱掉不稱職的總裁。 即使控制佔三分之一樣本數的受管制公司之變數後，本論文研究結果仍然是成立的.

關鍵字

董事 ； 總裁 ； 離職 ； 聲譽

並列摘要

The evidence provided by this research is consistent with the proposition that the tenure of poorly performing CEOs of S&P 500 is determined to some extent by the so-called pure reputation incentives faced by the boards of directors. Young outside directors are found to be more efficient monitors than those near retirement age, especially in the post-2000 period. Most of the directors holding multiple directorships appear to be less shareholder-driven than previous researches have shown. In addition, the market performance of the firm exerts a great pressure on the boards to remove underperforming management. These results hold after controlling for regulated firms, which represent approximately one third of the study sample.

並列關鍵字

BOARDS ； CEO ； DEPARTURE ； DISMISSAL ； TURNOVER ； UNDERPERFORMING ； REPUTATION

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